could consist of military service, participation in public building or irrigation projects,
transportation of barley or dates, agricultural work, flaying or fishing, to name just
some of the public tasks, they received rations or could cultivate a subsistence field,
a so-called suku field.
Hammurabi’s correspondence with Shamash-hazir and Sîn-iddinam, two high
officials who were situated in Larsa after its conquest, for a large part concerns the
assignment of suku land in the southern region. It appears that the ration system
was increasingly replaced by assignment of subsistence fields. Most often, the fields
were cultivated through lease contracts, frequently by musˇke ̄nu ̄m.
Although forbidden by the Codex Hammurabi (§ 26 ), individuals often sent
substitutes to fulfil their duty. Often, the substitutes were members of the same
family or household. Otherwise, they belonged to the poorer classes of the towns.
The service could also be paid off with an amount of silver, the kasap ilkim. During
the late Old Babylonian period, the collection of kasap ilkimby entrepreneurs from
the holders of suku fields (also an entrepreneurial activity) probably became the norm.
With this silver, the palace could hire labourers, fishermen and soldiers, which proved
to be an efficient system. By this time, the suku fields were considered part of the
family property.
CONCLUSIONSIn order to provide their power with an economic basis, the Old Babylonian rulers
integrated the existing economic units in a way markedly different from the pre-
ceding dynasties. Instead of establishing a centralizing bureaucracy, which controlled
all the details, and fully sustaining the labour force and the administrative apparatus,
the palace delegated as many tasks as possible. Thus, it shifted the economic risks
to the producers and the entrepreneurs. For certain sectors, such as trade, this tendency
can be observed already in the Ur III period. These practices minimized the official
administration and left more room for private initiative. While the dynasty was able
to remain in power for a longer time, it also necessitated the recurring cancellation
of debts through mı ̄sˇarumedicts.
BIBLIOGRAPHYCharpin, D. 1990 ‘Les édits de “restauration” des rois babyloniens et leur application’ in Cl. Nicolet
(ed.) Du pouvoir dans l’antiquité: mots et réalités. Geneva: Librairie Droz, 13 – 24.
Dyckhoff, C. 1998 ‘Balamunamhe von Larsa – eine altbabylonische Existenz zwischen Ökonomie,
Kultus und Wissenschaft’ in J. Prosecky (ed.) Intellectual Life of the Ancient Near East. Papers
Read at the 43 rd Rencontre Assyriologique Internationale, Prague, July 1 – 5 , 1996. Prague: Academy
of Sciences of the Czech Republic. Oriental Institute, 117 – 124.
Goddeeris, A. 2002 Economy and Society in Northern Babylonian in the Early Old Babylonian Period
(ca. 2000 – 1600 BC). Leuven: Peeters.
Kraus, F.R. 1984 Königliche Verfügungen in altbabylonischer Zeit. Leiden: Brill.
Renger, J. 2000 ‘Das Palastgeschäft in der altbabylonische Zeit’, in A.C.V.M. Bongenaar (ed.)
Interdependency of Institutions and Private Entrepreneurs. Istanbul: Nederlands historisch-archeologisch
instituut, 153 – 183.
–––– 2002 ‘Royal Edicts of the Old Babylonian Period’ in M. Hudson and M. Van De Mieroop
(eds) Debt and Economic Renewal in the Ancient Near East, Bethesda, MD: CDL Press, 139 – 162.
— Anne Goddeeris —