also to Egypt because of the conflict with Hatti. In the same way, the Elamites were
relevant to Hatti because of their conflict with Babylon, but they never left the
slightest conscious impression on Egypt. Effectively, however, the actions of each of
these actors was partially determined by the others, i.e., the Myceneans, the Hittites,
the Egyptians, the Mitannians, the Assyrians, the Babylonians and the Elamites.
It is easier to understand the lack of Babylonian interventions in Western Asian
politics by referring to Elam, which was threatening Babylon from the East. In this
sense, the Babylonian concern with Elam was the mirror image of the Egyptian
interest in Nubia. Thus one could not anticipate direct conflict of interest. And yet
such did emerge – along the Euphrates in the Iron Age. Strangely enough, however,
even the actual direct encounters between the Egyptians and the Babylonians were
not actually a reflection of a direct relationship. Although the Egyptians did lose the
battles of the Euphrates to the Babylonians, this took place as part of a misguided
Egyptian attempt to shore up the Assyrians, and did not reflect a fundamental hostility
to Babylon. Thus, one could logically propose that distance imposed some form of
perception of interests that permitted logistical issues to determine policy, but it was
the perception of interests, not the logistic obstacles, as demonstrated by the campaigns
of Naram-Sin and Shuppiluliuma.
Thus, via the Elamites and the Mycenaeans, we return to Egypt. Confronted with
the powers of Western Asia, the Egyptians preferred the course of least resistance
and pressed deep into Nubia. On the one hand, the lack of serious adversaries left
the Egyptians a free hand – and on the other, the Nubian gold was quite useful when
it came to satisfying the greed of rulers in Hatti, Mitanni, Assyria and Babylonia.
At the same time, the interaction of their adversaries actually made a defensive policy
in Western Asia a rational possibility, and thus a cordon of vassals assured a buffer
zone against Mitanni and Hatti. For the Egyptians, the policy brought the added
advantage of a stream of brides flowing into the royal harem. This necessarily came
to an end with the marauding of the Peoples of the Sea, but the immediate results
were more devastating for both Hatti and the Assyrians, rather than Egypt. It was
only later, as the Assyrian expansion recommenced, that Egypt would experience the
changed environment in which it was no longer the leading actor, but merely one
more element in a complicated web.
To some extent, the reign of Tiglath-Pileser I can be identified with the birth of
the Iron Age, not merely for chronological reasons, but also because the major actors
of the Iron Age can all be identified from this stage onwards: Elam, Assyria and
Babylonia. Neither Egypt nor the successor states of Hatti would play roles even
remotely comparable to those they had played in the Late Bronze Age. By contrast,
Egypt had played the decisive role in the Bronze Age.
It is a peculiar paradox of history that, whereas the memory of Egypt never faded
when the empires of Asia were effaced from Western history and Egyptian traditions
remained as mere monuments in the landscape, the intellectual traditions of the
Ancient Near East lived on.
NOTES1 The only possible encounter of ‘Great Kings’ in the Bronze Age known to the current author
is the postulated visit of a Hittite king to the Egyptian royal court. It is not certain that the
Hittite king Hattushili actually went to Egypt, but he was invited, and he may actually have
— Egypt and Mesopotamia —