over conquered territory which lay so far to the south-east of his own homeland.
Particularly in this early period of their history, the Hittites had neither the resources
nor the administrative machinery necessary to fulfil such a prospect. We can only
assume that, flushed with his success against Aleppo, Mursili sought both to enhance
his own reputation as a great warlord, and to provide even greater material rewards
for his troops and his kingdom’s royal coffers by despoiling and destroying what had
been one of the greatest and wealthiest cities of the Near Eastern world.
Perhaps he had a strategic motive as well. One of the most serious menaces
confronting his kingdom came from the Hurrian peoples who had spread through
much of northern Mesopotamia and northern Syria, and from there westwards into
Anatolia. They had already threatened the Hittite homeland in the reign of Mursili’s
grandfather Hattusili. And on their homeward trek after their conquest of Babylon,
Mursili’s troops were harassed by Hurrian forces. It has been suggested that Mursili
made some form of agreement with the Kassites, who were to fill the political vacuum
in Babylonia left by the overthrow of Hammurabi’s dynasty by creating a new ruling
dynasty there. Perhaps, the suggestion goes, the Kassites had done a deal with Mursili,
promising him a share of the spoils of Babylon, and possibly also a Kassite alliance
to offset the ever-present threat of Hurrian political and military expansion, both in
Syria and Anatolia (see Gurney 1973 : 250 ). This is a very speculative line of reasoning,
and probably assumes too high a degree of sophistication in the field of international
— Trevor Bryce —Figure 35. 1 The restored ramparts of the Hittite capital Hattusa.
(German Institute of Archaeology, Bogazköy-Hattusa Excavations.)