But for the remainder of Mursili’s reign, and that of his son and successor Muwattalli
(II), attention in the Syria-Palestine region focused on the escalating tensions between
Hatti and Egypt. These culminated in the battle of Kadesh, fought between Muwattalli
and the pharaoh Ramesses II in 1274. Though the battle itself ended in a stalemate,
the Hittites subsequently pushed Ramesses’ forces back to the region around Damascus,
where a frontier was established between Hittite and Egyptian subject territories.
Even so, tensions between the two kingdoms continued for the rest of Muwattalli’s
reign, and probably through the reign of Muwattalli’s son and successor Urhi-Teshub.
The latter occupied his kingdom’s throne for only a few years before he was over-
thrown and replaced by his uncle Hattusili (III), c. 1267. Banished to the Nuhashshi
lands in Syria, Urhi-Teshub made approaches to foreign kings for support in his bid
to reclaim his throne. Hattusili tells us of his secret plans to travel to Babylon
(Karaduniya), perhaps after preliminary negotiations with Babylonian officials in Syria,
and presumably to make a direct appeal to the Babylonian king, Kadashman-Turgu
at that time. But the exile’s plans were discovered, and Hattusili promptly had him
removed to another place of exile, whence he escaped and fled to Egypt. Ramesses’
alleged refusal to extradite him back to Hatti fanned afresh the still smouldering
tensions between Hatti and Egypt.
It is not unlikely that Urhi-Teshub’s plans to visit Babylon were made known to
Hattusili by Kadashman-Turgu himself. Hattusili claims, in a letter to this king’s
son and successor Kadashman-Enlil II (transl. Beckman 1999 : 138 – 43 ), that he
enjoyed a warm relationship with the father. His cultivation of this relationship may
have been one of the reasons why he distanced himself from his own father’s action
in sacking and banishing the Babylonian princess Tawananna. Without going so far
as to denounce this action, he seriously questioned its legality – by implication
endorsing Tawananna’s right to continue as the reigning queen during his father’s
reign. Admittedly, he does this in the context of a prayer to the Sun Goddess (see
Singer 2002 : 97 – 9 ). But Hattusili was above all an astute and opportunistic politician.
He would not have hesitated to make his views more widely known if he felt he
could derive political capital from them, particularly in the Babylonian court.
Hattusili must have set great store by his warm relations with Kadashman-Turgu,
since initially the Babylonian king appears to have been the only foreign ruler to
acknowledge Hattusili as Hatti’s legitimate monarch. The seizure of the Hittite throne
by Hattusili had been blatantly illegal. It had caused major divisions among the
king’s own subjects, many of whom still supported Urhi-Teshub. Moreover, by
granting Urhi-Teshub asylum in his own country, Ramesses too seemed to acknowledge
him as the rightful king of Hatti. This infuriated and frightened Hattusili. As long
as Urhi-Teshub remained at large, and had the apparent support of the pharaoh, the
usurper’s position on the Hittite throne would never be secure. Hence the importance
Hattusili must have attached to his relationship with Kadashman-Turgu, and to the
endorsement which Kadashman-Turgu gave him. Not only did Hattusili succeed in
winning acknowledgement from him as Hatti’s legitimate king, he apparently also
persuaded his Babylonian ‘royal brother’ to sever relations with Egypt. Indeed, it
appears from Hattusili’s letter that Kadashman-Turgu had even agreed to give him
military support should he decide to march on Egypt in order to get Urhi-Teshub
back: ‘[If your troops] go against Egypt, then I will go with you. [If] you go [against
Egypt, I will send you] such infantry and chariotry as I have available to go.’ (This
— Trevor Bryce —