secondary wives of the kings themselves could be non-Persian, and in certain
circumstances their sons might succeed to the throne. This is attested in the case of
Darius II ( 423 – 405 ). His father, Artaxerxes I ( 465 – 424 / 3 ), is said by Ctesias (FGrH
688 F 15 ) to have had three Babylonian concubines: Alogune, mother of Sogdianus,
who contested the succession; Cosmartidene, mother of Ochus-Darius (II), who
successfully seized the throne; and And(r)ia, mother of Parysatis, wife of Darius II.
Thus, while power was carefully restricted to an exclusive Persian aristocracy, this
small group of power-holders could, and did, incorporate selected members of the
subject populations. By these means, the governing elite established a system of
kinship ties and local alliances that reached right into the various dominated groups
and helped to root its power at the local level to create an identity of interest. In
Babylonia, the close interaction and shared interests of local entrepreneurs and the
Persian authorities is particularly clearly attested. Tax collection, land and irrigation
management created excellent opportunities for local families to amass wealth, and
their continued success and maintenance of social status was dependent on the stability
of the Persian regime.
Babylonian evidence also gives information about individuals at the lower end of
the socio-economic scale. Local peoples, soldiers from across the empire and deportees
were all allocated land-parcels that carried with them the obligation to perform a
variety of tasks – most strikingly military duties – as and when required. The latter
could be identified according to the kind of service required: ‘bow-land’ for archers,
‘horse-land’ for cavalry men and ‘chariot-land’ for chariot drivers and associated
equipment. Clearly the aim of assigning such ‘fief-holdings’ was intended to fulfil
imperial army requirements, while strengthening security through the presence of
military settlements. Just as clearly, the surviving sources reveal that, after the forma-
tive phase, general call-ups were relatively infrequent and that routine needs were
often fulfilled by mercenaries, so that at times the obligation associated with the
land-holding was discharged in the form of a tax. A complicated series of arrangements
is attested whereby holders of such ‘fiefs’ leased them out to financial firms, who
managed them on their behalf, by renting them out, collecting the dues, in naturalia,
and converting these through sale into silver for tax payments. Although this is a
deformation of the system, it is clear that it did not break down. Enough evidence
survives to show that the names of the original grantees, and the expected military
service associated with the grant, were kept on satrapal registers. The grants could
not be alienated, so when a demand came to supply, say, a cavalry-soldier, and the
descendant of the grantee was not in a position to carry this out, he was nevertheless
obliged to supply and equip a substitute to perform the service on his behalf. There
is thus no reason to suppose that the empire was overdependent on foreign mercenaries
and incapable of raising an army, throughout its existence, when necessary – a fact
shown clearly during Alexander’s invasion ( 334 – 330 ).
The empire’s far-flung territories were connected by a complex road system.
Herodotus ( 5. 52 – 54 ; 8. 98 ) describes part of it between Sardis and Susa. The Elamite
documents from Persepolis (Hallock 1969 : ‘Q’ texts) show it was much more extensive,
linking all the main centres of the empire and guarded by a series of posting stations,
which held supplies for travellers of fresh horses, fodder and food. Entitlement to
draw on these supplies was obtained by written authorisation issued to individuals
by the king, members of the court and satraps. They were extensively used, not simply
— The Persian empire —