96 { China’s Quest
Dehuai to form two new artillery divisions, using veteran Viet Minh troops
advised by PLA men who had served in Korea and armed, if necessary, with
cannon drawn from PLA stocks. Sufficient ammunition (Mao underlined
this phrase in his directive to Peng), along with additional anti-aircraft guns
and engineering equipment, was to be supplied to the new artillery divisions.
Dienbienphu “should be conquered resolutely,” Mao instructed Peng.
Mao also gave his thoughts about Viet Minh efforts after Dienbienphu
fell. Viet Minh forces should be allowed to rest for one or one and a half
months (no more than two months at most, Mao specified) before advanc-
ing on Luang Prabang on the Mekong River in the heart of northern Laos.
The newly strengthened Viet Minh would also be able to assault Hanoi and
Haiphong, Mao noted. He also directed that the plan to form two new ar-
tillery divisions should continue even if the conference at Geneva reached
agreement. In that event, however, the training of those forces should be
transferred from Chinese to Vietnamese territory as quickly as possible.^12
As the assault on Dienbienphu entered its final stage, China sent additional
artillery. Mao ordered the CMAG to employ the heaviest possible bombard-
ment. The final assault began on May 1. The last French fort surrendered on
May 7, East Asia time.
A top Chinese concern during the Geneva Conference was to prevent US
intervention in Indochina while maintaining North Vietnam buffer between
US power and the PRC. As the French position at Dienbienphu deteriorated,
US leaders considered intervening in support of the anti-communist side.
In line with the strategy of containment, US leaders were loath to concede
any part of Indochina to communism. US financial and logistic support for
the French anti-communist effort in Indochina had begun with the Korean
War, and had grown steadily. By 1954, Washington was financing most of the
French effort in Indochina. Washington believed that if France would grant
full independence to Vietnam, indigenous Vietnamese anti-communist
forces could, with US and French support, rally and stem the communist ad-
vance. This would clearly entail a full-scale US military effort, but US leaders
considered it vital to draw the line against further communist expansion. The
use of atomic bombs to raise the Viet Minh siege at Dienbienphu was consid-
ered by US leaders.
In late March, with the hard battle for Dienbienphu well under way, DRV
President Ho Chi Minh and Premier Pham Van Dong flew to Beijing for
consultations. Chinese leaders stressed their recently acquired experience
in negotiating with the Americans over Korea, and the consequent need to
maintain “realistic expectations.” The two sides agreed on the need to take a
“realistic approach” in upcoming negotiations.^13 The day after the last French
forces at Dienbienphu surrendered, the conference at Geneva began its dis-
cussion of Indochina. This portion of the conference was attended by the
“big five” plus the DRV, the French-supported “State of Vietnam,” the royal