98 { China’s Quest
Pham gave in and accepted the Chinese-Soviet proposal. Failure to compromise
at this juncture, Zhou argued, might cause loss of the opportunity for a peace-
ful settlement of the Vietnam problem. The problems of Laos and Cambodia
could be solved separately, Zhou argued. In Laos, where the VWP-allied Pathet
Lao was relatively strong, the communist delegations would push for a regroup-
ment zone consisting of two northern Laotian provinces contiguous to China,
Sam Neua and Phong Saly. (Figure 8-1 on page 205 shows the location of these
provinces.) Having secured VWP agreement, Zhou conveyed the new com-
munist position to French and British delegations. In effect, Chinese pressure
compelled the VWP to give up its plan to rule all of Indochina. Twenty-five
years later, in 1979, Hanoi’s pursuit of the same objective would lead Beijing to
go to war with by then communist-led united Vietnam.
VWP agreement to “realistic compromise” on the Laos and Cambodian
issues eliminated those problems. But the VWP still resisted the idea of par-
tition of Vietnam into regroupment zones. In early July, Zhou met for three
days on the Guangxi-Vietnam border with Ho Chi Minh, General Vo Nguyen
Giap, and DRV ambassador to the PRC Huang Van Hoan.^16 Zhou’s trump
card was the danger of US military intervention if an agreement was not
reached at Geneva. This danger was great, Zhou asserted, and would “greatly
complicate” the situation. That is, the DRV and China might find themselves
in a Korea-like war with the United States. Zhou persuaded Ho, and Ho in
turn persuaded the VWP Politburo.
Failure to accept temporary regroupment zones in Vietnam would create a
high danger of US intervention, Ho told his Politburo upon return to Vietnam.
It was necessary to consider the matter at the international level. Neither the
PRC nor the USSR wanted continued and possibly bigger war in Indochina.
Both socialist powers wanted a period of relaxation of international tensions.
The reality was that the VWP could not wage its struggles without Chinese
and Soviet support, Ho said. The VWP needed to act as good communists
and stay in step with the line of the world communist movement. Moreover,
Ho said, it was virtually certain that the Viet Minh would win the plebiscite
to be held one or two years after the French departure. The Viet Minh had led
the struggle for independence from France, had organizational skills beyond
any Vietnamese rival, and had Ho Chi Minh, with nationwide recognition
beyond that of any other Vietnamese leader. Given this, with the French gone
and the Americans held at bay, the Viet Minh were certain to win the elec-
tions, opening the way to peaceful national unification under the VWP. Ho’s
arguments persuaded the VWP Politburo.^17
When Zhou initially proposed the temporary partition/regroupment zone
plan to VWP leaders, he suggested the 16th parallel as the dividing line be-
tween zones. That would have pushed the VWP zone to the south, leaving in
VWP hands the highway extending westward from Quang Tri on the coast
into Laos. This in turn would have given the VWP a strong position for a