The Bandung Era } 111
or a Nepali invasion in 1792–1793.^42 But when the mission of those Chinese
armies was accomplished, they withdrew back to China proper, leaving only
a small guard to protect a representative of China’s emperor posted in Lhasa.
As Britain consolidated its rule over India in the nineteenth century, it upheld
this traditional arrangement between China and Tibet as a way of keeping
Russia out of, and keeping Chinese power only weakly present in, Tibet. As
the PLA marshaled to move into Tibet in 1949–1950, Indian leaders feared
that Tibet would become, for the first time in history, a platform for Chinese
military power. One of Nehru’s closest (and more realistic) advisors, Home
Minister Vallabhai Patel, argued at that juncture for a series of vigorous mea-
sures to counter the probable Chinese militarization of Tibet. Patel advocated
a military buildup, road building in frontier regions, and exploration of mili-
tary ties with the United States. Nehru saw Patel’s course as antithetical to
his vision of India’s non-aligned destiny, and opted instead for a friendship
offensive toward China.
Nehru hoped that Indian friendship would convince PRC leaders that
there was no need to militarize Tibet, since India, a friendly power, posed
no threat there, and that China should reciprocate Indian friendship by
being sensitive to Indian concerns and not militarizing Tibet.^43 As part of his
friendship policy toward China, on April 29, 1954, in the midst of the Geneva
Conference on Indochina and the intense battle for Dienbienphu, India signed
with China an eight-year agreement between India and the “Tibet region of
China.” The agreement used the phrase “Tibet region of China” nine times.
This was the first time India recognized China’s sovereignty over Tibet. India
did this without demanding or receiving a quid pro quo on the border issue
(or on anything else for that matter)—a source of considerable Indian criti-
cism and lament in following decades. With the 1954 Sino-Indian agreement
on Tibet, India abandoned all the special privileges in Tibet it had inherited
from the British era. Nehru imagined that this statement of fine principles
opened the way to India-China partnership and a new world order. The PRC
would, Nehru believed, be drawn away from close alignment with the USSR
and toward cooperation with India in building a new Asia and a new world.
This idealistic appeal was very popular in India. Zhou Enlai visited India in
June 1954 and was received by huge enthusiastic crowds shouting “Chinese
and Indians are brothers.” In October the same year, Nehru visited Beijing for
talks with Mao and Zhou.
Cracks in the facade of India-Chinese brotherhood began to appear at
Bandung. Conference participants were, as noted earlier, very impressed by
Zhou Enlai’s apparent humility and reasonableness, and his willingness to
listen to other’s arguments even when he disagreed with them. The impres-
sion left by Nehru was different. According to Carlos Romulo, the esteemed
Philippine diplomat and head of the Philippine delegation at Bandung,
many conference participants were “jolted by his [Nehru’s] pedantry. His