The Sino-Soviet Schism } 119
declare our condemnation of your military intervention.”^12 Confronted with
firm Chinese opposition, Moscow backed down. Beijing’s stance was not the
only factor and probably not the most important one determining Moscow’s
choice, but it was one factor. While happy with Khrushchev’s turnaround,
Mao noted that the Soviet leader had switched positions under pressure
from China.
Events in Hungary took a different direction, eventually toppling com-
munist rule in favor of a non-communist-dominated, multiparty coalition
government and a move to join the European community of states enjoying
freedom and democracy. On July 18, 1956, Mátyás Rákosi, the Stalinist leader
of the Hungarian Communist Party, resigned and was eventually replaced
by liberal communist Imre Nagy. Nagy’s new HSWP government began a
dialogue with opposition groups. Inspired by events in Poland, Hungary’s
liberal, anticommunist movement grew rapidly. The Hungarian communist
government found itself being forced to concede to liberal demands. This
process was watched closely by PRC representatives in Budapest. It would
be an episode recalled explicitly by CCP hardliners in May 1989 when
they found themselves facing a demand for dialogue with noncommunist
groups. On October 29, several days after Soviet forces had begun entering
Budapest, the dismantling of the HSWP’s political commissar system in the
military began. This was the key mechanism through which the Hungarian
communist party controlled the military. The next day, Nagy proclaimed
the restoration of a multiparty political system and formation of a multi-
party coalition government. The communist monopoly on state power was
over. On November 1, Nagy called on the USSR to withdraw its military
forces from Hungary. On the streets of Budapest, following shooting by re-
gime security forces into a crowd of demonstrators, bands of anticommu-
nists began to hunt down and lynch members of the regime’s hated political
police.
Late in October, the PRC embassy in Budapest learned that the Soviet
Union was preparing to withdraw Soviet military forces from Hungary. The
CCP Politburo met immediately to consider the situation. Mao again led the
discussion. Moscow was once again in error, Mao said. In Poland, Moscow’s
error was to move to intervene. In Hungary’s case, Moscow’s error was to not
intervene to crush the counterrevolutionary forces. It was clear that the situa-
tion in Hungary was unlike that earlier in Poland. In Poland, the communists
were still in control. In Hungary, the forces of counterrevolution were moving
to overthrow socialism. Proletarian internationalism required that Soviet mil-
itary forces intervene in Hungary to suppress the counterrevolutionary forces
and protect the achievements of socialism.^13 Mao’s views were again endorsed
by the Politburo, then conveyed to Moscow. Again the CCP stance influenced
Moscow. In the early morning of November 4, Soviet military forces began
a full-scale military assault on Budapest to oust the liberal communist Nagy