The Sino-Soviet Schism } 141
day as Zhou’s statement, Gromyko arrived in Beijing to discuss the situation.
Mao explained to Gromyko that Beijing’s objective was essentially psycholog-
ical. Yet Mao also reiterated Zhou’s earlier assurance that in case of war with
the United States, China would not expect or seek Soviet entry. Gromyko
was relieved by Mao’s assurances and “approved” of the Chinese approach.^62
According to Gromyko’s account, Zhou indicated that China was prepared
for all-out war with the United States. Gromyko paraphrased Zhou as saying,
“Inflicting blows on the offshore islands, the PRC has taken into considera-
tion the outbreak in this region of a local war between the United States and
the PRC, and it is now ready to take all the hard blows, including atomic
bombs and the destruction of its cities.”^63 In the event of a US-PRC war, Zhou
reportedly told Gromyko, the Soviet Union should remain neutral “even if the
Americans used tactical nuclear weapons.” Only if the United States resorted
to “larger nuclear weapons” should the Soviet Union “respond with a nuclear
counterstrike.” Mao told Gromyko that if it came to war with the United
States, China would draw US forces into China’s interior. Only then should
the Soviet Union strike with “all means at its disposal,” a reference Gromyko
understood to mean a nuclear strike.^64 According to Wu Lengxi, Mao reiter-
ated to Gromyko that in case of war with the United States, China would bear
the responsibility and not expect or seek Soviet entry. Gromyko was relieved
by and approved of Mao’s assurances.^65
Gromyko also brought with him and presented to Mao a draft of a letter
that Khrushchev was prepared to send to Eisenhower (which he did the next
day) warning the United States that an attack on the PRC would be deemed
to be an attack on the USSR. Mao found the Soviet letter to be 90 percent cor-
rect, and had Zhou revise the problematic 10 percent. Khrushchev then sent
that China-revised letter to the Americans.^66 In Wu Lengxi’s estimate, this
and other Soviet statements were “empty cannons,” fired only once Moscow
understood there was little real danger that the offshore imbroglio would es-
calate to a PRC-US clash. Tension in the area began to dissipate further on
October 6, when Defense Minister Peng Dehuai announced a ceasefire.
After reflecting on Zhou and Mao’s comments to Gromyko, Soviet leaders
became troubled by the reinterpretation of the terms of the 1950 treaty im-
plicit in those comments. On September 27, the CPSU sent a letter to the CCP
responding to Zhou’s September 7 comments to Gromyko. What troubled
Soviet leaders most was Beijing’s unilateral redefinition of the 1950 alliance.^67
The 1950 treaty had stipulated, the reader will remember, that “in the event
of one of the Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or any state al-
lied with her and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting
Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means
at its disposal.” Mao’s and Zhou’s comments to Gromyko on September 7 in
effect restricted the obligation to mutual assistance to situations involving
use of large-yield nuclear weapons. Zhou’s suggestion that the Soviet Union