160 { China’s Quest
It is noteworthy that India, over which Mao presented Khrushchev an
either-or choice in 1959, was a major recipient of Soviet aid. After 1954, when
Moscow started giving aid to noncommunist developing countries, India’s
claim on Soviet aid rose rapidly. For the 1954–1962 period, India received
$21 million more than the PRC, while thinly populated Afghanistan received
5/8 of the amount of credits extended to far more populous China. From
Beijing’s perspective, this distribution of Soviet aid reflected a lack of class
perspective and was unfair to China.
From Moscow’s perspective, not only were aid demands on the Soviet
Union a heavy burden, but aid to China was frequently poorly used, espe-
cially during the Great Leap Forward. Many Soviet-assisted projects under-
taken during the Great Leap were poorly planned. New plants often lacked
requisite infrastructure or were disrupted by the demands of Great Leap
mass campaigns. Expensive equipment sent from the Soviet Union often sat
unused. Maintenance was often ignored to reach inflated production goals.
Projects were often pushed through in mass campaign style, with the sound
technical advice of Soviet advisors being ignored. Living conditions for Soviet
advisors were often atrocious, and their mail, quarters, and belongings were
routinely searched by Chinese agents. On several occasions, Soviet advisors
were physically attacked. Nor, apparently, did Soviet aid generate a sense of
Chinese gratitude toward the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, it was not because of the misuse of Soviet aid that Moscow
suspended aid to China. In a public briefing for Soviet specialists at the Soviet
embassy in Beijing shortly after the announcement of the Soviet decision to
withdraw advisors, Soviet ambassador Stepan Chervonenko explained that
the main reasons for the Soviet decision were disagreement with China’s
confrontational approach toward the United States and India, the unneces-
sary aggravation of relations with Yugoslavia, Beijing’s excessive friendship
for Albania in opposition to Soviet policy, and the efforts of the Chinese
Communist Party to supplant the CPSU as the leader of the socialist bloc.^29
Still, there was a positive side of the Soviet aid cutoff for the CCP. In the his-
torical narrative the CCP formulated to explain the famine of 1959–1961, the
recall of Soviet advisors was accorded the major role. The CCP was able to
blame China’s famine on the Soviet move, along with bad weather, rather
than on its true cause, the disastrous policies of the CCP.The Consequences of Mao’s Multiple Rash DecisionsThroughout the second half of the 1950s Mao challenged Khrushchev’s lead-
ership of the international communist movement step by step. On issue after
issue, Mao charged, Khrushchev had made an incorrect analysis and pre-
scribed incorrect policies. On the Stalin question, on relations with the East