Reviving Revolutionary Momentum } 179
On October 6, after Indian forces continued to push forward into
Chinese-held territory in spite of increasingly stern Chinese warnings,
Chinese leaders decided to launch a large-scale punitive war against India.
According to foreign minister Chen Yi, whom Mao asked to brief the leader-
ship meeting on that day, forty-seven Chinese personnel had been killed or
wounded by Indian gunfire along the border. In all instances, Indian forces
and fired first, Chen said. India was also deploying artillery to forward posi-
tions, targeting Chinese outposts. An Indian assault on Thagla Ridge seemed
imminent. India had rejected Chinese efforts to begin negotiations over the
border conflict and had ignored repeated Chinese warnings. After hearing
Chen Yi’s report, Mao declared himself for war:
We fought a war with Japan, and with America. ... Now the Indians want
to fight a war with us. ... We cannot give ground [because] it would be
tantamount to letting them seize a big piece of land equivalent to Fujian
province. ... Since Nehru ... insists on us fighting him, for us not to fight
with him would not be friendly enough.^36
The CMC directive resulting from the October 6 meeting ordered the PLA
to prepare a large-scale attack to severely punish India, forcing it to cease its
aggressive policies. Assaults should occur in both western and eastern areas,
but the main blow should come in the east, where larger Indian forces made a
larger target on which severe pain could be inflicted.
Forcing India to take seriously Chinese power was a central factor in
Beijing’s decision for war. Nehru had ignored all China’s warnings out of a be-
lief that China was bluffing. As noted earlier, the realities of the military bal-
ance in the frontier regions overwhelmingly favored China. Yet India ignored
those realities and pushed forward aggressively. Nehru had concluded, Mao
determined, that China “was weak and could be taken advantage of,” “a dog
that barks but does not bite.” According to Mao: “Since Nehru says we only
‘bark but don’t bite,’ we absolutely must fight. We have no other choice.”^37 The
credibility of China’s warnings was at stake.
Under the PLA plan approved by the CMC, Chinese forces gave a final
warning to New Delhi; Chinese forces descended from Thagla Ridge to under-
take a four-day assault on an Indian outpost at the base of that ridge. Then the
Chinese withdrew and there was no further Chinese action for four weeks.
After no appropriate Indian response was forthcoming, and as Indian forces
continued to move forward in various sectors, on November 14 a massive
and well-prepared invasion force moved south, smashing into ill-prepared
Indian defenses, which collapsed. Retreats by Indian forces turned into routs.
Indian command and control collapsed. Key passes at Tawang, Bomdila, and
Seth La were only lightly defended, allowing Chinese forces to move forward
before Indian forces had time to prepare new lines of defense. By November
19, Chinese forces had taken Chako, only about fifteen miles from the edge