Countering the United States in Vietnam } 247
directing them not to be “too enthusiastic” in assisting the Vietnamese strug-
gle. “Excessive enthusiasm” seems an apt way to describe the sorts of prob-
lems that emerged. On the Vietnamese side—and perhaps subconsciously on
the Chinese side too—were memories of two millennia of Chinese attempts
to rule and Sinicize the Vietnamese, and of an equally long Vietnamese
struggle to resist those Chinese efforts and uphold Vietnamese independence.
Objectionable PLA behavior included the wearing of Mao badges and efforts
to conduct anti-revisionist ideological education with Vietnamese counter-
parts.^28 From the VWP’s perspective, the CCP’s anti-revisionist ideas were
completely out of place in Vietnam, a country waging a desperate, all-out
struggle against the United States. Washington, not Moscow, was the target
of struggle, in Hanoi’s view. Chinese troops also distributed literature laud-
ing economic construction in China. Exactly why this was objectionable is
unclear. Perhaps it suggested the superior status of China. Perhaps it sug-
gested that the DRV too should concentrate more on economic development,
rather than on war to liberate the South.^29 PLA medical teams were also pro-
viding treatment to Vietnamese. VWP leaders objected to this as well. The
CCP for its part objected to publication in a DRV journal of an article repris-
ing China’s invasions of Vietnam over history. Vietnamese port authorities
had also refused to allow a Chinese ship refuge in a DRV port during a US
bombing.
CCP General Secretary Deng Xiaoping and VWP General Secretary
Le Duan discussed these issues in April 1966, about a year after PLA units
entered the DRV.^30
Deng began by recalling Mao’s order directing Chinese in Vietnam not to
be “too enthusiastic” about rendering assistance. Deng then mentioned the
130,000 PLA troops in the DRV, the presence of other strong Chinese forces
on the DRV’s northern border (ready to intervene to counter an American
invasion of the DRV), and PRC-DRV planning for a joint war against the
United States. Deng continued:
Are you suspicious of us because we have so much enthusiasm? Do the
Chinese want to take control over Vietnam? We would like to tell you
frankly that we don’t have any such intention ... If we made a mistake
thus making you suspicious, it means that Chairman Mao is really
farsighted.^31
Le Duan replied that Vietnam always appreciated China’s assistance: “The
more enthusiasm you have, the more beneficial it is for us. Your enthusiasm
can help us to save the lives of two or three million people.”^32 VWP leaders also
deeply resented CCP refusal to form a united front with the Soviet Union in
support of Hanoi’s anti-US struggle. Following Khrushchev’s ouster, the new
Soviet leaders became much more supportive of Hanoi’s struggle. To a con-
siderable degree, this was a response to CCP criticism about Moscow’s weak