Countering the United States in Vietnam } 249
States. If a firmly united socialist camp, with PRC-USSR solidarity at its core,
stood behind the DRV, the Americans would be much more cautious in their
attacks. This analysis, of course, reflected DRV interests. Mao had his own
views and objectives. He saw a mounting Soviet effort, internal and external,
to direct the course of the Chinese revolution away from the “correct” course
and toward Soviet-style “phony communism.”
As long as Hanoi’s war with the Americans continued, VWP leaders swal-
lowed their bitter feelings about Mao’s putting China’s anti-revisionist struggle
above Vietnam’s anti-US struggle. Between late 1964 and mid-1975, Hanoi
perfected the art of balancing between Beijing and Moscow, using the rivalry
between those two powers to increase the support of each for Hanoi, and
thanking and lauding both as true and reliable friends of Vietnam. Because of
Hanoi’s acclaim among world progressives, both Beijing and Moscow sought
its affirmation. The VWP played that game well. Below the surface, however,
Mao suspected the VWP’s close and friendly ties with the CPSU, while Le
Duan deeply resented Mao’s betrayal of Vietnam.
V WP Embrace of Soviet Advice: The Growing Threat
of Soviet Encirclement
In 1968, Hanoi began following Soviet advice, and rejecting Chinese advice,
on key issues of war and political strategy. While the United States seemed
to be drawing away from South Vietnam, the prospect was growing that the
Soviet Union would replace the Americans in Vietnam. In the Chinese ver-
nacular, Hanoi was in danger of “letting the tiger in the back door, while
driving the wolf out the front door” (qian men chu lang, hou men ru hu).
There were two interrelated issues that defined Chinese-Soviet com-
petition for influence in Hanoi during the 1965–1968 periods: the military
strategy the VWP should use to fight the Americans, and peace negotiations
with the Americans.^34 Regarding military strategy, Beijing urged Hanoi to
wage a people’s war with emphasis on protracted but relatively low-intensity
guerrilla warfare in rural areas. This was, of course, in line with Mao’s classic
model of protracted war. In terms of its argument to Hanoi, Beijing warned
(in lines with Mao’s strategy) that big battles against main enemy forces and
cities would inflict heavy casualties on the revolutionary forces and lead
to demoralization. As noted earlier, VWP Secretary General Le Duan and
General Nguyen Chi Thanh rejected a pure Maoist-style guerrilla war in
favor of a combination of guerrilla warfare and large-unit, high-intensity,
aggressive assaults by conventional PAVN forces. Chinese leaders felt this
was an incorrect approach both because it was more in line with Moscow’s
prescriptions and because they felt it would not work. Hanoi’s adherence to
the Maoist prescription of people’s war was especially important for Beijing.