Countering the United States in Vietnam } 253
Beijing used the occasion of the start of four-party negotiations to recall
Chinese troops in the DRV and cut military assistance.^40 Beijing explained
this move as a response to the end of US bombing: since US bombing was
ended, there was no longer need for PLA anti-aircraft or engineering forces
for damage repair. VWP leaders, however, understood Beijing’s move as anger
over Hanoi’s choosing of Soviet over Chinese guidance.^41
The withdrawal of Chinese forces from North Vietnam in 1968 meant
that Chinese and American military forces were no longer fighting one an-
other. This eliminated one potential obstacle to PRC opening of ties with the
United States. That mayhave been one factor influencing Mao’s thinking. The
Chinese sense of betrayal by Vietnam in 1968 would be reciprocated four
years later in 1972, when VWP leaders simmered in outrage over Beijing’s rap-
prochement with Washington in the midst of intense US bombing of North
Vietnam. From Beijing’s perspective, the shifts in Hanoi’s policy in 1968 in-
dicated that the VWP was drifting into the CPSU’s orbit. Meanwhile, a new
president, Richard Nixon, had taken power in the United States in January
1969 and was giving clear signals he was interested in exploring a new relation
with the PRC.
Sino-American Rapprochement and the PRC-DRV Alliance
China’s opening of ties and initiation of a strategic dialogue with the United
States in 1971–1972 ipso facto undercut China’s deterrent support for the DRV.
The fears of Chinese intervention that had haunted US leaders since 1964 were
greatly eased. After rapprochement with China, the Nixon administration
resorted to previously unthinkably tough military moves against the DRV.
PRC-US rapprochement also undermined the VWP’s effort to convince the
United States people and leadership that the US cause in South Vietnam was
doomed and that the United States should recognize failure and wash its
hands of the Republic of Vietnam. Beijing recognized the contradiction be-
tween its US and its DRV policies, and tried to manage those contradictions
by paralleling the process of rapprochement with stepped-up aid for the DRV.
Hanoi accepted China’s renewed assistance and thanked Beijing for it, but
privately VWP leaders were furious.
Endorsement of Hanoi’s negotiations with the United States was another
component of Beijing’s effort to manage Hanoi’s anger at Beijing’s opening to
the United States. From 1968 through late 1970, China abstained from endors-
ing or criticizing Hanoi’s efforts at the Paris negotiations. The Chinese media
reported on those talks and Hanoi’s various moves and countermoves, but in
neutral tones.^42 Then, as Beijing began maneuvering toward rapprochement
with the United States, it began endorsing VWP moves at the Paris talks.
Mao’s first overt attempt to signal Washington of his interest in improved