Countering the United States in Vietnam } 257
full withdrawal of US military forces from Vietnam, to be followed at some
unspecified later date by a political settlement within South Vietnam and,
finally, unification. From the VWP perspective, the delinked approach pro-
posed by the United States was strongly reminiscent of the bitter medicine
forced on the VWP at Geneva in 1954.
Beijing urged Hanoi to delink military and political settlements, granting
the United States a face-saving exit and interval before South Vietnam fell
to the revolutionary forces, as it certainly would. Mao himself told French
foreign minister Maurice Schumann in July 1972 that he had advised PRG for-
eign minister Nguyen Thai Binh to stop demanding Thieu’s removal as a pre-
condition for a settlement with the United States.^48 Zhou Enlai later explained
the logic of China’s position to a group of senior CCP cadres shortly after the
January 1973 peace agreement was signed:
We told the Vietnamese comrades: we must be practical and realistic.
The U.S. herself knows that to continue fighting means to stall for time
with no way of knowing how long she will procrastinate. Therefore,
she will make a “glorious withdrawal” through negotiations. Besides,
having fought for so many years, the Vietnamese people have suffered
great losses. To continue fighting will not affect the outcome for a mo-
ment. But to compel the Americans to withdraw through negotiations
will leave you yourselves half to one year for rest and consolidation.
You can reconsider the problem of liberating South Vietnam later. The
Vietnamese comrades have accepted our suggestions.^49
According to a VWP account, late in 1971 Mao urged Premier Pham Van
Dong to postpone temporarily the liberation of the south, saying, “One can’t
sweep very far if the handle of the broom is too short. Taiwan is too far away
for our broom to reach. Thieu in South Vietnam is also out of reach of your
broom, Comrade. We must resign ourselves to this situation.”^50 As a great
power, Mao explained to Dong, the United States could not afford to forsake
its old friends such as Nguyen van Thieu. Dong reportedly replied to Mao that
Vietnam’s broom had a very long handle.
Beijing matched its urging of moderation on the VWP with deliberate dis-
association from US efforts to pressure the VWP. During his talks in Beijing
in July and October 1971, Kissinger devoted considerable time to explain-
ing US policy toward Indochina in hopes that Beijing could be induced to
exercise some moderating influence on Hanoi.^51 Zhou rejected these over-
tures and replied with reiteration of China’s strong support for Hanoi. When
shortly before Nixon’s visit to China, Kissinger sent Zhou a detailed report
on Hanoi’s rebuffs of US negotiating efforts at Paris, Zhou replied with an
“acerbic note” accusing the United States of trying to enmesh China in the
Vietnam issue.^52 During Nixon’s February 1972 talks in China, Zhou declared
China’s sympathy and support for Hanoi and urged the United States to end