The Cultural Revolution } 283
threats, including nuclear war threats. Should a handful of war maniacs dare
to raid China’s strategic sites in defiance of world condemnation, that will be
war, that will be aggression, and the 700 million Chinese people will rise up
in resistance and use revolutionary war to eliminate the war of aggression.”^37
As Lin Biao said in his report to the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969: “We
will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly
cou nterat tack .”
The nature of Chinese counterattack by land was left to the imagination
of Western analysts of that era. The vital Trans-Siberian rail line was vulner-
able, as were a number of cities of the Russian Far East. A campaign of PLA
raids in force might impose on Moscow a war of indefinite strategic defense.
If Soviet forces could be lured into Chinese territory, the PLA could employ
a more classic people’s war. Beijing launched a mass campaign to prepare the
country for war. People were mobilized to dig tunnels and construct bomb
and fallout shelters. Grain and other strategic materials were stockpiled. “Dig
caves deeply and store grain everywhere” became the slogan. Imports of raw
rubber, a vital wartime material, from Southeast Asia rose to all-time highs.^38
Militia units were called up and training was intensified. Basic marksmanship
and tactical skills were the focus of training. Defense industrial facilities were
relocated to more remote and defensible locations. Caves carved into moun-
tainsides for the purpose were a favored venue. To the extent possible, PLA
units disengaged from domestic politics and concentrated on preparations
for war with the Soviet Union. Two armored divisions and three anti-aircraft
divisions were deployed to the region of China’s nuclear research, develop-
ment, and testing facilities in China’s northwest.
China also used its modest nuclear arsenal to help deter Soviet attack.
Though only a dozen or so in number, China’s deployable atomic bombs
were reportedly moved to forward positions. Means of delivery were prob-
lematic. China could not then deploy long-range missiles that might hit
more distant Soviet cities. The PLA had some Chinese copies of the Soviet
1950s-style Tu-16 “Badger” bombers, but these were highly vulnerable to the
Soviet Union’s sophisticated air defenses. Still, one or two might get through
to Soviet targets. “Exotic” modes of delivery were also discussed by Western
analysts. Typically, this entailed disassembly, infiltration, and then reas-
sembly and detonation of bombs in the vicinity of Soviet targets. As the crisis
peaked in September, China tested an atomic bomb (its seventh test of a fis-
sion bomb and its first underground). A week later, it tested an immensely
more powerful fusion bomb (its third such test). Beijing handled these tests
very cautiously so as not to broadcast the image of reckless use of nuclear
weapons. It made clear, however, that if it was attacked with nuclear weapons,
it would retaliate in kind.
The 1969 crisis began to ease following a September 11 meeting of Premier
Kosygin, a leader of the no-war faction in the CPSU leadership, and Zhou