300 { China’s Quest
or sacrifice of the Nationalist regime on Taiwan would lead to a backlash in
the United States that would destroy the new relation that Nixon and Mao
were attempting to build.^23 If Mao and Zhou wanted the new relation with the
United States that Nixon was risking his career to build, they would have to
accommodate to some degree US interests regarding Taiwan.
Throughout the eight months of negotiations, Zhou and his diplomatic
assistants deputy foreign ministers Qiao Guanhua and Huang Hua attempted
to focus the talks on the issue of Taiwan. Kissinger and Nixon, on the other
hand, tried to frame the issue more broadly in terms of the larger global bal-
ance of power. Beijing was intensely focused on the core issue of Taiwan, while
from the US perspective, Taiwan was one of a number of issues that needed to
be considered. During the first negotiating session in July 1971 between Zhou
and Kissinger, Taiwan was the very first issue raised by Zhou. Kissinger had
tried in his opening statement to frame the issue in terms of the withdrawal
of US military forces from Taiwan. Zhou insisted that the issue be framed
in a more fundamental way, in terms of the US stance on the legal status of
Taiwan. Zhou told Kissinger:
If this crucial question is not solved, then the whole question [of
PRC-US relations] will be difficult to resolve.... In recognizing China
the US must do so unreservedly. It must recognize the PRC as the sole
legitimate government of China and not make any exceptions.^24
Turning aside another attempt by Kissinger to focus on the disposition
of US military forces, Zhou insisted on returning to the basic issue of prin-
ciple. Relations between Beijing and Taipei were China’s “internal affair,”
Zhou insisted, and “the United States must recognize that the PRC is the
sole legal government on China and that Taiwan province is an inalienable
part of Chinese territory which must be restored to the Motherland.” When
Zhou that evening reported to Mao this tough opening move, the Chairman
directed him to take a more relaxed approach:
There’s no hurry for Taiwan, for there’s no war there. A war is being
fought and lives lost in Vietnam. It we want Nixon to come, we cannot
think merely of ourselves.
On several other occasions during the negotiations, Mao ordered greater
Chinese flexibility. During Kissinger’s second visit to Beijing in October
1971, for example, when Kissinger was negotiating with Huang Hua the text
of the communiqué to be issued at the conclusion of Nixon’s upcoming visit,
Huang insisted that the communiqué indicate that Nixon had sought the
invitation. Kissinger refused Huang’s proposed formulation. The issue was
reported to Mao, who laughed and told Huang to revise his proposed text.
This was done and agreement was swiftly reached with “both sides feeling
happy,” according to Huang Hua.^25 Another example of Mao’s flexibility