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of one China, albeit the Republic of China rather than the People’s Republic
of China. In talks with Zhou, Nixon went further in accepting China’s posi-
tion, saying “There is one China and Taiwan is a part of China.”^28 In the final,
written agreement (the Joint Communiqué), however, the United States merely
“acknowledged” and “does not challenge” the position of “all Chinese” that
Taiwan is a part of China. Clearly implicit was the idea that this was not the
US position. Use of the verb “acknowledge” (renshidao in Chinese) rather than
the more potent verb “recognize” (chengren in Chinese)—the term used under
international law to confer sovereignty upon a claimant to membership in the
community of sovereign states—in both the English and Chinese texts put
further distance between China’s claim to Taiwan and the US position regard-
ing that claim. Each of these manifestations of Chinese “flexibility” would
have been approved by Mao.
The Shanghai communiqué did not include a Chinese pledge to rely on
peaceful means to reunify Taiwan and the mainland. The contrast between
the position of the two sides on this issue was glaring. The US statement
stressed “peaceful solution.” The Chinese statement said that “the liberation
of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right
to interfere,” a formulation that contained assertion of the right to use mili-
tary force. During negotiations, Zhou repeatedly underlined, in accord with
Point Three of the Politburo guidelines, China’s willingness “to strive” for
unification by peaceful means. This was an attempt by China to address the
US concern about a possible PRC attack on Taiwan, but do so in a way that
did not compromise what Beijing felt was its sovereign right to use force and
thus compromise China’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. Left implicit in
Zhou’s statement was the proposition that nonpeaceful means might become
necessary if Beijing’s “striving” via peaceful means was unsuccessful.
The elements of the 1971–1972 PRC-US accommodation over Taiwan were
not a victory for either side. They were, instead, a hard-bargained and del-
icately balanced accommodation of the interests of the two sides. As Zhou
explained to Nixon toward the end of negotiations, the Chinese people had
“feelings” regarding Taiwan. “But it is possible for us to persuade our people
because of the prestige of the leadership of Chairman Mao.”^29 As Kissinger
put it, the accommodation of 1971–1972 “put the Taiwan issue in abeyance,
with each side maintaining its basic principles. Despite the continuing dif-
ferences over Taiwan, our rapprochement with China accelerated because we
shared a common concern about the threat to the global balance of power.”^30
“Common concerns” of the PRC and the United States regarding the
Soviet Union were embodied in what became known as the anti-hegemony
clause of the communiqué. It read: “Neither [the PRC nor the United States]
should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to
efforts by any country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.” The
Soviet Union was not explicitly identified, but all savvy people understood