Rapprochement with the United States } 311
India’s alignment with Moscow, and especially the conclusion of the
August treaty, had a deep impact on Chinese policy. After the treaty was
signed, China’s media increasingly framed Indian policies as part of a Soviet
effort to encircle China. India’s alignment with Moscow also laid the basis for
the US handling of the crisis: if China acted to support its ally Pakistan, and
if the Soviet Union acted against China in accord with its obligations under
the August treaty while the United States did nothing as China was “humili-
ated” (to use Kissinger’s words) by the Soviet Union, the emerging Sino-US
rapprochement could collapse and any hope of a US-PRC entente to balance
the Soviet Union would be destroyed.^44 The strategic basis of the emerging
PRC-US relation was common opposition to Soviet expansionism. If the
United States now stood by and did nothing while Moscow and its Indian ally
partitioned Pakistan, Mao and Zhou might doubt US commitment to the new
anti-Soviet partnership.
Zhou Enlai saw early on that Pakistani resort to a military solution of
Pakistan’s deepening West-East conflict carried great dangers for that coun-
try. During a visit to China by President Yahya Khan in late 1970, Zhou urged
the Pakistani leader to find a fair solution to the problems facing Pakistan.
After elections in December 1970 that produced two ethnically distinct legis-
latures in West and East Pakistan, Zhou wrote to leaders of both wings urging
them to find a satisfactory political settlement.^45 Again in April 1971, as blood-
shed in the east escalated, Zhou expressed China’s concern for Pakistan’s fu-
ture to high-level Pakistani envoys. Unless a political solution was quickly
found, Zhou said, there could be grave consequences for Pakistan. The use of
military force against East Pakistan’s civilian population could be disastrous,
Zhou warned.^46
Zhou understood the deep roots of the Bengali rebellion and was aware
that in many ways it was a classic national liberation struggle. He also ap-
parently understood that the Bengali liberation movement might succeed,
leaving China in a position of needing to court a new Bangladeshi state. And
in any case, China was not in a position to prevent Indian intervention. But
China could not abandon its ally Pakistan. Thus Beijing balanced between
inactivity that would alienate Islamabad, and activity that would endanger
China’s ties with a future Bangladeshi state.^47
In April 1971, as bloodshed in East Pakistan mounted, with Pakistani
repression countered by growing Indian covert support for the Bengali re-
sistance, China delivered a protest to India condemning India’s “gross inter-
ference” in Pakistan’s internal affairs. The note warned that Pakistan would
have China’s “firm support” if Indian expansionists dared launch aggres-
sion against Pakistan.^48 China’s media and foreign propaganda polemicized
against Indian and Soviet interference in East Pakistan. The same month,
Pakistan’s rulers sought a pledge of Chinese intervention in the event of an
Indian attack. Beijing declined. After deliberating over Pakistan’s request,