320 { China’s Quest
at the April 1974 Sixth Special Session of the United Nations on raw materials
and development. Mao’s designation of Deng rather that Zhou to deliver this
statement—the first by a top Chinese leader to the United Nations—was part
of Mao’s effort to degrade Zhou’s position and groom Deng as a more polit-
ically reliable successor (or so Mao hoped) to manage China’s state sector.^12
Mao’s message to the Chinese people and the world in appointing Deng rather
than Zhou to deliver this high-profile speech at the UN was this: Zhou Enlai
does not speak for China. In early 1975—the last year of Zhou’s life—Jiang
Qing’s radicals intensified their criticism of Zhou’s diplomacy, making public
many of the charges leveled during the closed Politburo session.
But one final effort by Zhou would later bear fruit. In January 1975, Zhou,
with Deng Xiaoping’s assistance, drafted a program shifting China’s emphasis
from political struggle to economic development. The Four Modernizations
(of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense) was
designed to turn China into a world power. Opposition by CCP radicals and
lack of interest by Mao would prevent its immediate implementation. But once
Deng became paramount leader in December 1978, the Four Modernizations
would be revived and driven forward with great vigor. In helping Zhou draft
the Four Modernizations program, Deng convinced him that he, Deng, was
committed to China’s economic modernization, whatever his professed loy-
alty to Chairman Mao’s line might be. This positioned Deng to inherit Zhou’s
very considerable base of support when the premier died.^13
The conflict between Zhou and Jiang Qing over foreign policy, like Mao’s
effort to undercut Zhou because of his management of foreign policy, was not
really about foreign policy. It was about Zhou’s great prestige and influence
within the CCP and PLA elite. Mao did not really disagree with Zhou’s for-
eign policy; Zhou was, in fact, executing Mao’s policies. Rather, Mao seized
on diplomacy as a way of undermining Zhou because he feared Zhou would
“reverse verdicts” on the Cultural Revolution if Zhou survived him with his
prestige undiminished. Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao attacked Zhou on
his “rightist capitulationist” diplomacy, but they did so because Mao gave
them a green light. Jiang’s group was in no position to critique the substance
of Zhou’s diplomacy, because it was Mao’s diplomacy. The radical attack on
Zhou’s diplomacy was merely a foil. The real question was who would domi-
nate the political scene after Mao.
Nonetheless, the radical attack on Zhou’s “rightist capitulationism” did
influence China’s diplomacy in areas other than Cambodia. Sino-US rela-
tions chilled briefly. From mid-1974 through 1976, Beijing became much more
abrasive in dealings with US representatives. Acerbic rhetoric replaced ear-
lier silky handling. The atmosphere of President Ford’s December 1975 visit
was chilly. Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua felt compelled to deliver a direct
critique of US foreign policy, to which Kissinger felt complied to rebut with
equal directness. When a new head to the US Liaison Office was appointed