332 { China’s Quest
the two countries, established diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level,
pledged peaceful resolution and no threat of use of force in resolution of all
disputes, stated that Japan “fully understands and respects” Beijing’s claim to
Taiwan, and copied verbatim the anti-hegemony clause of the PRC-US joint
communiqué of February.
There were several points on which Zhou made concessions to Japan. In
the joint communiqué, China “renounced its demand” for war indemnities
from Japan.^38 This was a Chinese concession that probably did not accord
with the sentiments of the Chinese people. Use of the term “demand” rather
than “right” also embodied implicit Chinese acquiescence to Tokyo’s argu-
ment that the Republic of China, then representing China in Tokyo’s eyes,
had already abandoned China’s “right” to indemnities in the 1952 ROC-Japan
peace treaty. In China’s eyes, of course, that treaty was completely illegal. Yet
Zhou Enlai agreed to the term “demand,” implying at least acknowledgement
of the 1952 treaty. Zhou also decided not to press the issue of the Sengaku/
Diaoyutai islands. When Tanaka raised this issue, Zhou suggested that this
issue not be discussed but left for some indefinite future time. In bidding
farewell to Tanaka, Zhou also conveyed his best wishes to Japan’s Emperor
Hirohito—who had reigned throughout Japan’s 1931–1945 invasion of China.
Evidence from Chinese archives is not presently available, but it may be that
this series of conciliatory Chinese moves toward Tokyo was part of Zhou’s
“rightist capitulationist diplomacy” attacked by Jiang Qing on Mao’s behalf
in 1973–1975.
The “history issue” (the chronicle of Japanese aggression against China)
injected a sour note into the September 1972 negotiations. In the course of a
welcoming banquet for the Japanese delegation, Zhou’s speech touched on the
history issue:
Friendly contacts and cultural exchanges between our two countries
have a history of two thousand years, and our two peoples have forged
a profound friendship; all this we should treasure. However, in the
half-century after 1894, owing to the Japanese militarist’s aggression
against China, the Chinese people were made to endure tremendous
disasters and the Japanese people, too, suffered a great deal from it. The
past not forgotten is a guide for the future.^39
In his reply speech, Tanaka spoke of his “profound self-examination” of
the fact that Japan had caused “meiwaku” to the Chinese people. The Japanese
word meiwaku was translated as “ma-fan,” a mild form of trouble or nuisance.
The Chinese listeners in the banquet hall felt far understated the immense
suffering born by Chinese as a result of Japan’s invasion, and when Tanaka’s
reference to “ma-fan” reached their ears, many immediately stopped their ap-
plause and turned visibly cold. Tanaka later took great pains to explain to
Zhou that meiwaku in Japanese means a genuine apology. It may be noted,