China\'s Quest. The History of the Foreign Relations of the People\'s Republic of China - John Garver

384 { China’s Quest

would pour through the breach in enemy lines and push deep into the enemy’s

rear area to encircle and annihilate enemy forces.^2 This may have been sound

in theory, but proved impossible for PLA forces to achieve in practice. PLA

reconnaissance of terrain was inadequate. Maps were out of date. Terrain often

proved more rugged than anticipated—heavily jungled or steep mountains

and few roads. This was the PLA’s first attempt to apply combined arms opera-

tions in which tanks and artillery coordinated closely with infantry. Chinese

infantry and tanks had not trained to cooperate together. Tanks without

infantry support were vulnerable. Infantry that rode into battle on tanks were

vulnerable. Tanks and infantry commanders had difficulty communicating.

Vietnamese forces outflanked by the PLA withdrew into nearby mountains

or forests where they knew the location of caves and tunnel complexes, and

reemerged to attack the flanks and logistical lines of Chinese forces. Chinese

commanders were compelled to deploy forces on search and destroy opera-

tions to hunt down Vietnamese guerrillas and bypassed units. PLA logistics

services were inadequate to supply front-line forces, in spite of the fact that a

substantial portion of PLA forces were devoted to that task. Communication

and command problems plagued the Chinese side. Vietnamese weapons,

many recently supplied by the Soviet Union and others inherited from the

large US-supplied arsenals of South Vietnam, were often superior to China’s.

Because of these factors, Chinese forces were often unable to achieve the

desired superiority of mass and firepower. In spite of these many and seri-

ous shortcomings, Chinese forces achieved their operational objectives, if not

always according to the original schedule. Both sides were willing to accept

heavy casualties. Attack and counterattack were nearly constant.

On February 27, ten days into the war, the battle for Lang Son began.

Taking this city, thereby making clear to SRV leaders that the road to Hanoi

Gulf of

Tonkin

Red

(^) R.
Hanoi
Haiphong
Lang Son
Dong Dang
Lao Cai
VIETNAM
CHINA
LAOS
Lines of Chinese advance
Area occupied by PLA forces
F IGU R E 14-1 China’s 1979 Punitive War against Vietnam
Source: Zygmunt Czarnotta va Zbigniew Moszumansk, p. 25, via Wikipedia Commons.