Pedagogic War with Vietnam } 399
including “friends of foreign [i.e., non-Chinese] nationality of Chinese de-
scent,” had an important role to play in China’s development.^40
Beijing’s call for Overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia to
contribute to China’s economic modernization effort was strengthened by
Beijing acting as protector of South Vietnam’s ethnic Chinese. As noted ear-
lier, a number of Southeast Asian governments shared sentiments about their
ethnic Chinese communities not dissimilar from Hanoi’s. There was even a
regional temptation to adopt a harsh “Vietnamese-style,” or perhaps an even
more vicious 1965 “Indonesian-style,” solution to the “Chinese question.”^41
These fears were part of the political culture of Southeast Asia, for ethnic
Chinese and non-Chinese alike. If Beijing responded forcefully to Hanoi’s
harsh anti-Chinese policies, Beijing could position itself as the protector of
Southeast Asia’s ethnic Chinese. Of course, if overplayed, that approach could
exacerbate apprehensions of Southeast Asian governments about the loyalty
of Chinese communities. Political calculations aside, Hanoi’s blatantly dis-
criminatory treatment of Vietnam’s ethnic Chinese, seemingly in repayment
for China’s long support for Hanoi, roused deep anger among Chinese, both
leaders and ordinary folk.
China’s media and government strongly protested Hanoi’s persecution
of the ethnic Chinese. While waves of “boat people” were tempting fate in
the South China Sea in 1978, Beijing dispatched two ships to evacuate any
Chinese who desired to leave. Hanoi refused permission for the ships to enter
Vietnamese ports, and the ships rode at anchor off those ports for several
weeks. Hanoi charged Beijing with “gunboat diplomacy” and acting as though
it was sovereign over Vietnam’s ports. If Beijing was so concerned about over-
seas Chinese, Hanoi charged, it should send ships as quickly as possible to
Khmer Rouge Kampuchea to rescue the Chinese being murdered there.
A final dispute underlying Beijing’s decision to chastise Vietnam in 1979
was Hanoi’s challenge to China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea.
As explained in an earlier chapter, China claimed all the islands in the South
China Sea. Throughout the long DRV-US war, Hanoi did not challenge those
claims. As long as Hanoi needed Beijing’s help to fight the United States, it
kept quiet about its opposition to Beijing’s territorial claims in the South
China Sea. When the PLA consolidated its control over the Paracels in 1974,
the leaders in Hanoi did not publicly protest Beijing’s move, but privately they
saw it as the first overt act of Chinese aggression against socialist Vietnam.^42
Once the Americans were defeated, Hanoi no longer needed China’s support
and began protesting China’s claims. A week after Saigon fell, that city’s offi-
cial newspaper, now under VWP control, published a colored map showing
both the Paracel and Spratly Islands as Vietnamese territory. Further open
claims by Vietnam to these islands followed. Hanoi’s abrupt turnaround on
the South China Sea angered Chinese leaders. It seemed yet another example
of VWP insincerity and unprincipled hypocrisy.