436 { China’s Quest
“government in exile” in the Himalayan foothills of northwestern India.
Conflicting views of Tibet generated further animosity. Indian leaders and
public opinion were dismayed at the antireligious and Han Chinese chauvin-
ist policies inflicted on the people of Tibet during the Mao era. Chinese lead-
ers were dismayed at India’s hosting of the Tibetan government in exile and
allowing Tibetan refugees to conduct a wide range of what Beijing felt were
anti-China political activities. Behind the scene was India’s Establishment 22,
the highly trained, well-armed, and Indian-commanded Tibetan force con-
figured for commando operations in Tibet, perhaps in the event of another
round of Sino-Indian war. Beijing supported, or at least maintained links
with, sundry ethnic insurgencies in India’s northeastern states, while in
India memories of China’s betrayal of Indian friendship in 1962 (or so many
Indians viewed it) still rankled. The territorial issue remained unresolved,
with the military forces of both sides prepared to mobilize for another round.
Within the Indian military, the sting of the 1962 humiliation was still strong,
as was a corresponding desire for an opportunity to redeem India’s honor
from that defeat.
If it came to another China-India war in the 1980s, China would not have
a superpower on its side, unlike in 1962. In 1962, the Cuban missile crisis had
made Moscow suddenly desirous of having China stand beside it as Moscow
faced down Washington, and that had produced Soviet support for China
against India for a short while. By the 1970s, Moscow was backing India
against China. And while the United States might have stood behind China
when it “taught (communist-ruled and Soviet-allied) Vietnam a lesson,”
Washington certainly would not support China against democratic India. As
poor as US-Indian relations often were, with the singular exception of the
December 1971 Bangladesh crisis, Washington eschewed involvement in mil-
itary challenges to India.^20 If China faced a second round with India, it would
do so alone, without a superpower backer. Beijing would also have to confront
Indian forces in some of the most rugged and remote terrain in the world, the
Himalayan-Tibetan massif, a region much closer to India’s heartland than to
Ch i na’s.
The collapse of Indira Gandhi’s quasi-dictatorial Emergency and the elec-
tion of India’s first-ever non–Congress Party government led by Morarji
Desai in March 1977 offered Beijing an opportunity to attempt an opening
to India. Deng Xiaoping was fully rehabilitated only months after Desai took
over India’s government. Desai came into office determined to remedy what
he deemed to be a perverse pro-Soviet, anti-American and anti-Chinese tilt in
Indian foreign relations under the long-ruling Indira Gandhi. Beijing moved
quickly to seize the opportunity. In March 1978, Wang Bingnan, chairman
and first secretary of the CCP group within the Chinese People’s Association
for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC), led an “unofficial” Chinese
delegation to India—the first Chinese visit in many years. In talks with Desai,