484 { China’s Quest
of peaceful evolution. Ties with the United States were extremely dangerous,
these rightists said. In response, China should seek to reorient its opening
away from the United States and the West, toward the Third World plus the
socialist countries of Eastern Europe.^36
Deng saw the hard-line confrontational approach as a serious threat to
China’s opening. He countered by advancing two “basic points.” First, the
threat from Peaceful Evolution was a long-term one targeting future genera-
tions. It was not an immediate threat. As long as veteran revolutionaries like
Deng and his fellow elders were alive, hostile foreign forces could be held in
check. Second, the threat was essentially internal, not external. “The crucial
factor was the ideological firmness of CCP members,” Deng ruled. “If some-
thing wrong occurs in China, it will come from within the Party.” As Allen
Whiting noted, this formulation shifted responsibility for the 1989 uprising
from the “international climate” to the “domestic climate.”^37 Following this
assessment, early in 1992 Deng edited out references to “peaceful evolution” in
a draft of Premier Li Peng’s work report to an NPC session. The same month,
Deng ordered Xinhua to avoid harsh criticism of the United States:
We should adopt a “careful and positive” policy, and report well on bilat-
eral relations and exchanges between China and the United States. ... A s
for U.S. words and deeds interfering in our internal affairs and harm-
ing our sovereignty ... we should expose this. But we should carry out a
reasonable, beneficial, restrained struggle, and not use phrases such as
“Western hostile forces headed by the United States.”^38
A turning point in the struggle over “peaceful evolution” and opening ap-
parently came in a series of Politburo meetings in February 1992, just after
Deng’s “southern tour” in which he highlighted the successes of south China’s
opening and reform, along with his own firm support for that approach.
Thirty-five conservative party leaders had reportedly sent Deng a letter urg-
ing vigorous opposition to “peaceful evolution,” indoctrination of commu-
nist ideology, and limitation of reform to those of a socialist (i.e., nonmarket
and non–private sector) nature. Deng went all out and mobilized support to
decisively reject this conservative proposal. General Secretary Jiang Zemin,
who had earlier kept one foot in the conservative camp, came down squarely
in support of Deng. Jiang and Yang Shangkun made self-criticisms for earlier
inadequately firm support for opening. A solid majority of the Politburo lined
up behind Deng. Several high-ranking Politburo members who had previ-
ously opposed Deng’s approach shifted position and began openly supporting
Deng and his approach.^39 China would not again close itself off. Deng had
won over the civilian leadership. His next challenge would be from the PLA.