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leader Lee Kuan Yew visited Beijing to preside over formal initiation of dip-
lomatic relations.
Chinese diplomatic reassurance of India was difficult because of the depth
of the conflicts between those two countries. But even in New Delhi, Qian
made gains. In March 1990, Qian visited India for talks on issues of mutual
concern. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which involved nonin-
terference by Western powers in the internal affairs of developing countries,
was a major theme of the talks. India had often been the target of Western
criticism over harsh measures toward secessionist movements. Qian also
stressed the desire to continue building on the agreements reached during
Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s breakthrough December 1988 visit to
China. Qian signaled that Beijing hoped to settle the chronically festering
territorial dispute, a gesture intended to reassure New Delhi.
The most important Chinese gesture toward India during 1989–1990 was
what it did not do. In March 1989, India had implemented a harsh economic
embargo of Nepal because of Kathmandu’s initiation of military and secu-
rity relations with China.^13 Chinese analysts saw India’s embargo of Nepal as
a manifestation of Indian hegemony and unreasonable targeting of China’s
friendly, cooperative ties with a South Asian neighbor, Nepal. But fearful
that Chinese support for Nepal might drive India into hostility toward China
at this sensitive juncture, Beijing essentially left Nepal on its own, without
Chinese support. In 1988 Nepal’s royal government had begun purchasing
weapons from China, and then had signed a secret intelligence exchange
agreement with China. Both moves went beyond Indian tolerance for China’s
role in strategically located Nepal, and New Delhi responded with a year-long
economic embargo that had a devastating impact on Nepal’s economy. In
the midst of Nepal’s travail, China did and said little. Chinese coverage of
the India-Nepal crisis was low-key and objective. When Vice Premier Wu
Xueqian stopped in New Delhi in October 1989, he meekly expressed the
hope that the South Asian nations would use the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence to manage their relations. When Li Peng visited Kathmandu the
next month, in the midst of India’s economic coercion of Nepal, he merely
lauded Nepal’s efforts to cope with unspecified “difficulties.” China did not
resort to the Security Council, as it easily could have. It did not condemn
Indian actions, nor use such terms as “bullying,” “hegemony,” or “power pol-
itics.” Chinese economic aid to Nepal continued, but additional aid was min-
imal. In effect, Beijing stood aside as New Delhi imposed a China-exclusion
policy on Nepal. Alienating India in 1989 could have been dangerous. India
has a very special and sensitive relation with Tibet, and Tibet was one focus of
the new Western human rights concern over China.
The culmination of Beijing’s friendship offensive toward India came in
December 1991, when Li Peng made the first visit by a Chinese premier to
India in thirty-one years. (The previous visit in 1960 had been by Li’s adoptive