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usher Beijing out of its post-6-4 isolation had been part of Japan’s push for
regional leadership. When China was isolated, it served Beijing’s interest to
encourage that push. Once China’s need for Japanese diplomatic assistance
had eased, Beijing focused more on the history issue, reflecting the clash
between China’s and Japan’s aspirations to regional leadership.
China’s European Theater
China’s diplomatic almanac points out that following Japan’s reviving of
credits to China, the West European countries began restoring credit guar-
antees for exports to China, government loans, and economic cooperation
with China. Japan had opened the way, but European countries soon followed
Tokyo’s lead.^21 In Qian Qichen’s view, Sino-European diplomatic interactions
combined with the rapid advance of Japanese-Chinese relations during 1989
and 1990 to convince European leaders that unless they hurried to repair ties
with China, European firms would lose their share of the China market.^22
Following Tokyo’s lead, in October 1990 the EU decided to cancel sanctions
against China and restore normal commercial and political ties with China.
EU aid, ministerial visits, and concessional lending to China resumed.
Britain led the way. London was concerned that the situation in Hong
Kong might unravel and wanted Beijing’s cooperation, especially regarding
funding and other arrangements for a new airport and container harbor that
were part of London’s effort to engineer a smooth transition to Chinese rule
in 1997. Britain’s foreign minister in July 1990 was the first West European
foreign minister to visit China after 6-4, largely because of the need to restart
talks over Hong Kong’s impending transition. Beijing insisted that a visit by
Britain’s leader to Beijing was required to pin down crucial arrangements for
Hong Kong. Thus it was that Prime Minister John Major in September 1991
was the first European leader to visit Beijing after the Beijing Massacre. Major
faced strong criticism from human rights groups and the political opposition
over his visit to Beijing, but retorted: “I have to live in the real world. It would
not be proper to sit back and strike attitudes and let the Hong Kong people
pay the price.”^23 On his flight to Beijing, Major assured the public of his deep
concern for human rights:
China has had a period of isolation. It needs people going in and telling
them face-to-face what the rest of the world thinks. An important part
of the dialogue [in Beijing] will be on human rights. I will raise the
issue and I will carry it as far as I can without provoking a breakdown
of communication.
Major’s chief concern was arrangements for financing US$16 billion in air-
port and harbor projects. Major conducted those talks with Premier Li Peng.