522 { China’s Quest
and postponed a Moscow summit meeting between Bush and Gorbachev. It
was in this context that Beijing in February 1991 extended the US$700 million
credit. It was CPSU deputy chair Vladimir Ivashko who snagged the second
credit for China. Ivashko later told the Communist Party newspaper Pravda
that the initiative for the loan came from the Chinese, not the Soviet, side.
This demonstrated, Ivashko said, the “political significance” of the credit. The
loan was a demonstration of China’s “moral support for the renewal process”
in the Soviet Union and was of “great importance.”^42 Renmin ribao reported
Ivashko’s remarks without comment.China and the Attempted August CoupOn August 19, 1991, hard-liners within the CPSU attempted a military coup to
impose martial law, oust both Gorbachev and Yeltsin, and reestablish proper
Soviet order. The coup organizers had long felt that Gorbachev’s reform pro-
gram was endangering the continued existence of the socialist system and
the unity of the Soviet state. In effect, the coup was an attempt to implement a
“Chinese solution” in the USSR. The Soviet coup collapsed within three days,
largely because military units refused to go along.
PLA Chief of Staff Chi Haotian was in Moscow for a weeklong visit ending
August 12, a week before the Soviet coup attempt began. On the evening of
August 11, Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov telephoned and asked to
meet with Chi. According to Hong Kong reports, at that meeting Yazov asked
Chi how the CCP viewed the Soviet situation. Chi replied that China was
worried about the deterioration of the Soviet economy and the possibility of
a split in the nation. Yazov then said that some comrades in the army were
ready to “take action.” Chi reportedly replied: “We adhere to the principle of
not interfering in the internal matters of the Soviet Union, but we express our
understanding.”^43 On August 18, the day Chi returned to Beijing, an enlarged
Politburo meeting reportedly convened to hear Chi’s account of the Soviet
situation.
China’s media responded very swiftly to news of the Soviet coup. This
celerity lends credence to reports that China’s media had guidance in hand
when news of the coup arrived and, by extension, that China’s leaders had
foreknowledge of the coup that led to the dissemination of that media guid-
ance. The day after the coup began, nearly all of China’s major newspapers
carried a front-page Xinhua item entitled “Gorbachev Suspended from
Performing His Presidential Duties.” Many also included a background ac-
count of coup leader Gennady Yanayev. Xinhua’s coverage of coup activities
was extensive—at least forty-two items on August 20. This also indicates that
Xinhua knew in advance what slant to take. Xinhua gave extensive and fac-
tually accurate coverage to the activities of the coup leaders. It reported on