Constraining Unipolarity } 537
In fall 1989, only months after 6-4, the Bush administration began con-
sulting with China and other permanent members of the UN Security Council
(the “Perm-5”) about a UN framework for a comprehensive Cambodian set-
tlement based on the ASEAN plan of 1981. Between January and August 1990,
there were six Perm-5 sessions on Cambodia. Beijing supported this process,
and a Perm-5 Framework Agreement was signed in Paris in August. This
Framework provided for placing the Vietnam-backed Cambodian govern-
ment of Hun Sen under UN supervision and control; creating a transitional
Cambodian authority headed by Norodom Sihanouk, also to be under UN
supervision; the disarming of Cambodian factional armies by the UN; and the
organization of free and fair elections by the UN leading to a new government.
It was widely assumed that the Khmer Rouge would not fare well in free elec-
tions, as was indeed the case.
In the Cambodian negotiation process that began in fall 1989, China pushed
for inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in both the transitional Cambodian author-
ity and in the elections that were to follow. Only in this way, Beijing argued,
could the Khmer Rouge be induced to give up armed struggle. According
to Qian’s memoir, during a meeting in New York in September 1989, US
Secretary of State James Baker accepted China’s demand for inclusion of the
Khmer Rouge. Baker initially pushed for China to agree to exclude the Khmer
Rouge, but when Qian insisted that the Khmer Rouge be given a role, Baker
“reluctantly accepted.”^22 Qian, however, reassured Baker “There is no pos-
sibility of the Khmer Rouge seizing power in Cambodia, and China would
not support such an outcome.” According to Richard Solomon, the United
States accommodated these Chinese demands because the prospect of Khmer
Rouge participation in the settlement process gave China the leverage neces-
sary to persuade the Khmer Rouge to give up armed struggle. In the event,
this did not happen. The Khmer Rouge refused to disarm or to participate in
the electoral process. They did this, however, without China’s support, and
over the course of several years after the settlement the Khmer Rouge split
and then disintegrated.
Arranging the structure of power among the four Cambodian factions
was the most difficult part. China pushed initially for the complete disman-
tling of the Hun Sen government and participation of Khmer Rouge repre-
sentatives in the transitional Cambodian authority. Eventually, however,
Beijing agreed that the Hun Sen regime would merely be placed under the
“supervision and control” of the UN. Compromise on the sensitive issue of
Khmer Rouge participation was reached by allowing Khmer Rouge to par-
ticipate as individuals rather than as representatives of their group. Offering
a role to the Khmer Rouge met very strong opposition in the US Congress,
where a China-supported Khmer Rouge return to power was deemed the
greatest danger. Responding to this pressure, in mid-1990 the United States
dropped its long-standing support for a UN General Assembly seat for the