China\'s Quest. The History of the Foreign Relations of the People\'s Republic of China - John Garver

566 { China’s Quest

Xiaoping’s prestige within the PLA had been diminished by 6-4, and PLA

people were more willing to criticize him. The newly designated successor

as paramount leader, Jiang Zemin, had no military background and needed

to build influence with PLA officers. Heeding PLA calls for larger defense

budgets and accelerated military modernization reflected all of these consid-

erations. The military modernization that began in early 1991 was not a crash

program to prepare the country for war. It was, instead, a carefully focused,

incremental but sustained effort to give the PLA the ability to fight and win

the type of war witnessed in 1991.^19

China and the 2003 Regime Change War in Iraq

Beijing’s policy during the United States’ 2003 regime-change war in Iraq

maintained the same principled opposition to US resort to military force as in

1991, while manifesting a significantly greater degree of cooperation with the

United States. In 2002–2003, Beijing worked actively with the United States at

certain junctures to circumvent stronger opposition from France, Russia, and

Germany, and voted “yes” on the resolution that the United States (at least)

saw as authorizing the use of force.

Beijing’s situation in 2002 was far different than in 1990. In 1990, China’s

economic stakes in the Gulf were largely limited to labor service sales. By 2002,

the PRC had become a major importer of Persian Gulf petroleum—about

56  percent of China’s imported oil came from the Gulf region. China had

also begun investing in Iraqi oil development. In 1997, the China National

Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) had agreed to invest $1.26 billion in a

twenty-two-year proposal in Iraq’s al-Ahdab field.^20 Chinese oil majors were

also negotiating with Iraq over three other development projects that, if real-

ized, would have provided half of China’s oil import needs. All these energy

projects contradicted US efforts to sharply limit foreign investment in Iraq’s

energy sector because of Iraq’s nonfulfillment of the terms of the February

1991 ceasefire agreement. Beijing’s political position in 2002 was also far

stronger than in 1990. Western sanctions resulting from the Beijing Massacre

were long past. At the end of 2001, China had entered the WTO. Finally, the

2003 war did not erupt by surprise as had the 1990 crisis. Beijing had many

months to consider its policy response to a US war to oust Saddam Hussein.

These considerations seem to have led Chinese leaders to conclude that since a

war seemed inevitable, China’s interests would be best served by making that

war as brief and as minimally disruptive as possible.^21

During Security Council debates in October 2002 over authorization

of use of force, the United States proposed a resolution giving Iraq a final

warning to comply fully and completely with UN inspection efforts, and set-

ting a firm deadline for such compliance. Failure to comply by the specified