China and America in the Persian Gulf } 575
activities had involved China—prior to China’s 1997 disengagement from
Iran’s nuclear efforts. This discovery of undisclosed Iranian nuclear activities
led the United States to propose “referral” of Iran’s nuclear program to the
Security Council under Article VII of the UN Charter dealing with “actions
with respect to threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggres-
sion.” This would open the way to sanctions or authorization of use of mili-
tary force, and it was the beginning of a many-year-long process of the United
States soliciting Chinese cooperation, China being compelled to respond one
way or the other to those solicitations.^29
Broadly speaking, Beijing stayed in step with the other Perm-5 powers,
while finding ways to distinguish itself from the United States and assist
Tehran. China initially opposed referral to the Security Council, insisting
that the IAEA was the proper forum to handle the issue. Beijing also sup-
ported Iran’s “right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy” under the NPT,
thereby implicitly rejecting Washington’s argument that Tehran had forfeited
that “right” by its long history of violation of the NPT via its nonreported
nuclear activities. Washington then proposed that the Perm-5 send a joint
note to Tehran expressing their concern. Beijing rejected this but agreed
to send a separate note. Beijing wanted to minimize the appearance that it
was acting in coordination with Washington against Iran. Finally, in March
2006, Beijing agreed to “report,” but not “refer,” the Iran nuclear issue to the
Security Council. “Refer” was objectionable because that was the word Article
VII used with Security Council handling of breaches of the peace and acts of
aggression.
In July 2006, the Security Council began drafting a resolution, eventu-
ally numbered 1696, demanding that Iran suspend uranium enrichment
and warning Tehran of sanctions if it did not comply with Security Council
demands regarding IAEA inspection of Iran’s nuclear programs. Again
Beijing softened the terms on Tehran’s behalf. Beijing initially blocked refer-
ence to Article VII. It secured deletion of a US-proposed reference to a “threat
to international peace and security” and doubled the deadline given for
Tehran to respond, increasing it to thirty from fourteen days. After Tehran
ignored the Security Council deadline, that body began drafting a list of
Iranian individuals and entities involved in that country’s nuclear programs.
Over the next three years, the Security Council would pass three more reso-
lutions imposing penalties on Iran over its nuclear programs. With each of
these resolutions, Beijing ultimately voted “yes,” but only after narrowing the
scope of sanctions and keeping them targeted only on people and entities ver-
ifiably linked to Iran’s nuclear activities, excluding sanctions targeting Iran’s
energy sector, the economy generally, or “normal international commerce.”
China thereby protected the substance of its economic partnership with Iran.
Beijing insisted that normal economic interaction, including investment and
involvement in Iran’s energy sector, should not be targeted by UN sanctions.