588 { China’s Quest
we would hate to see happen—that is, we considered what we should do
if serious disturbances occurred in Hong Kong during the 15-year tran-
sition period. ... If the announcement of the recovery of Hong Kong has,
as Madam put it, ‘a disastrous effect,’ we shall face that disaster squarely
and make a new policy decision. ... I am concerned that there may be
major disturbances in this [15-year] period, man-made disturbances.
These could be created not just by foreigners but also by Chinese—but
chiefly by Britons. It is very easy to create disturbances. This is precisely
the problem our consultations will be designed to solve.^19
But while thus making clear that there was a mailed fist inside his velvet
glove, Deng indicated a willingness to cooperate with Britain in accomplish-
ing a smooth reversion that would not destabilize Hong Kong’s existing eco-
nomic and political status quo. Deng proposed:
We suggest ... that the two sides begin consultation on the question of
Hong Kong through diplomatic channels. The prerequisite [for this] is
the understanding that China will recover Hong Kong in 1997. On this
basis we should discuss how to carry out the transition successfully in
the next 15 years and what to do in Hong Kong after the end of that
period.”
Deng gave Thatcher a two-year deadline for the British and Chinese gov-
ernments to reach agreement on Hong Kong’s reversion: “in no more than
one or two years—China will officially announce its decision to recover Hong
Kong. We can wait another year or two, but definitely not longer.” The mes-
sage was that if no agreement were reached in two years, the PRC would pro-
ceed unilaterally. Within the framework of these Sino-British talks, China
was prepared to be accommodating, Deng indicated. Hong Kong would re-
main “capitalist,” and “many systems currently in use ... will be maintained.”
Policies for Hong Kong “should be acceptable to the people of Hong Kong and
also to foreign investors.” The “main concern” was that Hong Kong remain
prosperous; otherwise, Deng said, China’s “drive for modernization” might
be affected.^20 According to Xu Jiatun, Thatcher “who was famous for her un-
yielding way of handling things,” was “in a dazed condition” after her “rebuff ”
by Deng. This caused Thatcher to stumble while going down the stairs of the
Great Hall of the People after her meeting with Deng. “Although this was an
accident,” Xu Jiatun wrote, “it had in fact shown how seriously ... Thatcher had
been frustrated.”^21
Deng’s tough approach worked. For six months, from September 1982 to
March 1983, London resisted acceptance of Beijing’s precondition of Chinese
sovereignty over Hong Kong. Finally, in the words of McLaren, “a way was
found around China’s precondition,” when Thatcher sent Zhao Ziyang a note
saying that she was prepared to recommend to Parliament that sovereignty