604 { China’s Quest
glitch, though under heavy rain, providing a transfer that was face-saving
for both sides.
By confronting Britain, Beijing averted the expansion of democratic
processes and institutions in Hong Kong after its reversion to China. It did
this while avoiding positioning itself as an antidemocratic power. Instead,
Beijing occupied the moral high ground of an agreement-abiding power
insisting that Britain abide by the agreements which it had already accepted.
The most crucial audience that Beijing had to convince was the people of
Hong Kong. The fact that Beijing was able to abandon cooperation with
Britain and unilaterally handle Hong Kong’s reversion without precipitat-
ing flight of financial or human capital from Hong Kong suggests, to this
author in any case, that Beijing’s policies effectively served PRC and the CCP
interests. Paradoxically, Beijing’s relatively effective diplomacy seems to have
been premised on a basic misperception of British intentions.Chinese Misattribution of British Purposes?How accurate were CCP views that after London’s post-6-4 LegCo election
proposals were part of a Western conspiracy to foment turmoil in China?
The memoirs of Percy Cradock, Robin McLaren, and Chris Patten give no
indication of an intention to destabilize Hong Kong or undermine the CCP
government of China. Cradock and McLaren explain Britain’s increased
post-6-4 concern with LegCo democracy as a function of upholding Hong
Kong’s promised autonomy, thereby stabilizing Hong Kong.^60 Christopher
Patten explains his democratic quest as a function of British public opinion
and the moral obligations of Britain to the people of Hong Kong. It is possible,
of course, that perfidious Albion had a secret strategy behind its bland state-
ments and subsequent memoirs. But no documentary evidence of this exists,
as far as this author is aware. I believe that the tentative conclusion must be
that Chinese leaders’ attributions of motives to London were inaccurate.
It is tempting to dismiss as a mere propaganda ploy the stated Chinese
view of a plan or effort to destabilize Hong Kong and China, as mere attribu-
tions designed to tarnish British negotiating moves. As Xu Jiatun recognized,
Chinese accusations of nefarious intent certainly were functionally useful to
Beijing’s struggle against London. But statements by Qian Qichen and Xu
Jiatun—PRC officials responsible for handling Hong Kong—suggest that attri-
bution of nefarious motives was not merely instrumental, but reflected genu-
ine belief. Top Chinese leaders actually seem to have believed that directly
elected LegCo seats, along with the Lantao airport scheme, were part of a
British plot to destabilize China. Did Britain actually aim to destabilize Hong
Kong and China? Were Chinese attributions valid? It is possible that eventual
declassification of British documents will reveal otherwise, but pending that