640 { China’s Quest
reversion went off without any such difficulties, preparations for Jiang’s US
visit went into high gear.^7
Beijing pushed hard for a fourth communiqué on the Taiwan issue which
would make public and enshrine in a joint document the concessions made
by Clinton in his secret July 1995 letter to Jiang: the United States would not
support Taiwan independence, would not support Taiwan’s admission to the
United Nations, and would not support creation of two Chinas—dubbed the
“three nos” by China’s media. Without agreement along these lines, the MFA
suggested, the summit exchanges might be difficult. When the United States
flatly rejected this proposal, the Chinese side expressed hope that the discus-
sion would continue during Jiang’s visit to the United States. In the event,
Chinese lobbying for some statement on Taiwan along these lines continued
throughout the first days of Jiang’s visit and right up to two hours before Jiang
was scheduled to meet Clinton at the White House.^8
Washington, for its part, pushed for complete suspension of Chinese
assistance to the nuclear and missile programs of Iran and Pakistan, even
though Iran was a member of the NPT and with its known nuclear facilities
under IAEA safeguards and inspections. Nor had Iran then been found by
the IAEA to be in violation of its NPT obligations. (This came only after
the 2002 revelation of Iran’s nuclear complex at Natanz.) Yet in the negotia-
tions over the 1997–1998 summit exchange, Beijing acceded to US demands
regarding both Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. We still do not know
the full logic of Beijing’s decision, but at a minimum, it distanced Beijing
from the ever-deepening conflict between Tehran and Washington. Qian
Qichen’s major concern regarding this adjustment in Sino-Iran relations
was confidentiality. He suggested, and the United States agreed, that the
matter be dealt with in a confidential letter from him to Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright.^9 The United States also agreed to handle the matter in
a low-key fashion. China’s media were ordered not to report on this sen-
sitive Chinese concession. China’s agreement to end nuclear cooperation
with Iran opened the way to implementation of a 1985 treaty making US ci-
vilian nuclear technology available to China. It represented a major adjust-
ment in China’s policy so as to avoid confrontation with the United States
in the Persian Gulf. Regarding Pakistan, however, China flatly refused
US demands to suspend nuclear and missile cooperation. Pakistan was
China’s vital strategic ally, rather like Israel to the United States, Chinese
negotiators said.
Jiang’s October 1997 visit was carefully choreographed. On his way to the
United States, he stopped over in Hawaii to lay a wreath at the Pearl Harbor
memorial, effectively underlining the World War II Sino-US alliance against
Japan. Jiang then proceeded on to Williamsburg, Virginia, where he visited a
colonial-era theme park, striking another resonant chord with his American
audience. While in Williamsburg, Jiang donned a colonial-era tricorn hat,