654 { China’s Quest
nationalism. Like earlier episodes, it also demonstrated the way in which
popular anti-American nationalism generates both support for the CCP
regime and pressure on that regime to act firmly to defend China’s honor and
interests.
The airplane collision occurred barely nine weeks after the new George
W. Bush administration took office. China’s leaders were apprehensive the
new US leaders would shift China policy away from the cooperative approach
that had once again been embraced by Washington circa 1997. During the
2000 election campaign, Bush had criticized the Clinton administration for
treating the PRC as a “strategic partner” when in fact it was a “strategic com-
petitor,” or so candidate Bush said. The new Bush administration also placed
greater stress on strengthening the US network of bilateral alliances in Asia—
with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand—which
Chinese leaders saw as moves designed to contain China. Many of the key
leaders of the new administration were also perceived in China as “hawks,”
“Cold Warriors,” and pro-Taiwan, further inclining them toward hostility to
the PRC.^28
The airplane collision reignited the debate over Beijing’s US policies.
Hard-liners on the PBSC argued that Washington’s words and actions in-
dicated that the Bush administration had already shifted policy away from
cooperation toward containment. Hostile US moves included upgrading
alliance partnerships in Asia, involving Japan in Theater Missile Defense,
expanding arms sales to Taiwan (one of Bush’s first foreign policy moves
after his inauguration), and not least, Washington’s arrogant and aggressive
handling of the EP-3 imbroglio. It followed, CCP hard-liners said, that China
should adopt a tough tit-for-tat policy.^29
The moderate point of view, which eventually prevailed, maintained that
US presidential candidates often make anti-China statements, but act differ-
ently once in the White House with full responsibility for securing US inter-
ests. These people cited Reagan and Clinton as examples of this shift toward
cooperation with China once they bore the responsibilities of the presidency.
Moreover, the Bush administration had not yet had time to put in place a
China policy team, much less to think through and reorient US strategy to-
ward China and Asia. If, however, China overreacted to the EP-3 collision, it
could push the new Bush administration toward containment. Eventually, a
consensus was reached. Positive ties with the United States were very impor-
tant in maintaining a positive macro-climate for China’s development drive,
and China should continue to push for improvements in ties with the new
administration. But it would defend its honor and its interests, and not appear
weak or fearful in dealing with US provocations and insults.
It took several days for China’s leaders to gather accurate information
about how the collision had actually occurred. Local military authorities on
Hainan apparently did not initially report the extremely close, high-speed