Long Debate over the US Challenge } 659
strategic depth against India.^36 Now, in fall 2001, Washington was demand-
ing that Pakistan make a clear choice: abandon the Taliban and join with
the United States against the Taliban, or stand with the Taliban against the
United States.
In this quandary, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf turned to China.
After initial discussions with China’s ambassador to Pakistan, Musharraf
sought an emergency visit to China to further discuss the situation. Beijing
advised against such a visit (perhaps because it would raise China’s profile at
this ultra-sensitive juncture).^37 Instead, in late September, as Pakistan moved
toward renewed partnership with the United States, Jiang Zemin spoke with
Musharraf by telephone. As reported by Xinhua, Jiang “spoke highly” of and
expressed “full understanding and respect” for Pakistan’s cooperation with
the “international community” against terrorism.^38 In other words, Beijing
endorsed Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States in the “global war on
terrorism.” The Americans’ Pakistani road to Afghanistan was open.
China’s advice almost certainly played an important role in Pakistan’s deci-
sion at this juncture.^39 Had China, Pakistan’s main strategic backer and secu-
rity partner, objected to Pakistan’s re-engagement with the United States,
it is doubtful that Musharraf would have said “yes” to Bush. Beijing urged
Pakistan to cooperate with the United States not in order to help out the
United States, but because Pakistan-US partnership comported with China’s
own interests at several levels. First, US re-engagement with Islamabad would
strengthen Pakistan (via renewed aid, military assistance, etc.), which would
help maintain Pakistan as a balancer to India—China’s elemental interest in
South Asia. Second, having the United States re-engage with Pakistan would
make US-India ties more difficult, slowing and perhaps blocking the forma-
tion of an India-US strategic partnership. Establishing robust US-Pakistan
ties would also ease Indian pressure on China over Beijing’s robust ties with
Pakistan. Beijing could now point to Pakistan-US cooperation when New
Delhi objected to Pakistan-China cooperation. Third, helping the United
States wage its global war on terrorism would divert US energies and atten-
tions away from China while gaining US gratitude for China’s assistance, per-
haps extracting a few quid pro quos from the Americans for China’s help.^40
By the end of 2001, less than nine months after the airplane collision,
PRC-US relations were quite cordial. Beijing’s robust cooperation with
Washington in the global war on terrorism delighted the Bush administra-
tion and transformed the PRC-US relation into a close partnership. A joint
working group on counterterrorism was set up and met twice annually to
coordinate measures in intelligence gathering, financial monitoring, and
antiterrorist actions at the United Nations. Hong Kong, a vitally important
transport and financial center under Chinese sovereignty, was brought into
the antiterrorist fight. Beijing, of course, shared with Washington an interest
in preventing al-Qaeda and like-minded groups from disrupting the global