Long Debate over the US Challenge } 665
exploded torpedo. An international Joint Investigation Group (JIG) consist-
ing of experts from South Korea, the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia,
and Sweden was assembled to conduct a forensic investigation of the sinking.
After several months’ intensive investigation, the JIG determined that the ship
had been sunk by a torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine. The back-
grounds of this incident and another in November involving North Korean
bombardment of a South Korean island were complex, involving transfer of
power in the North Korean regime; inter-Korean relations, including dis-
puted maritime boundaries; and international pressure on North Korea to
abandon nuclear weapons. Our concern, however, is with China’s response to
this North Korean attack.
North Korea had been China’s ally since 1950, when Chinese interven-
tion rescued that regime from extinction. China’s post-1978 discovery of the
wealth-generating potential of marketization and participation in the global
economy led Beijing to urge North Korea to follow a similar path. Throughout
the rule of three North Korean rulers (Kim Il-Sung, who ruled from 1948 to
his death in 1994; his son Kim Jong-Il, 1994 to 2011; and Kim Jong-Il’s son
Kim Jong-Eun, 2011 to present), Chinese prompting went unheeded. North
Korea remained isolated from the world and mired in deep poverty. After
the collapse of the USSR, North Korea became highly dependent on Chinese
economic support. North Korea’s economy was integrated into China’s eco-
nomic sphere via trade and Chinese investment. Pyongyang showed little
gratitude to China, and China’s support earned Beijing little influence in
the North Korean capital. Yet China continued to sustain the North Korean
regime out of fear that its demise would lead to South Korea’s annexation of
the North along the lines of Germany’s 1990 unification, or another Chinese
military intervention in Korea to prevent that from happening. Such devel-
opments could lead to another Korean War with the United States or the
inclusion of North Korea into the US-South Korean military alliance. In this
context, Beijing’s response to the Korea crises of 2010 signaled a strengthen-
ing of Chinese support for North Korea. Beijing signaled Washington and
Seoul that retaliatory military action against North Korea risked confronta-
tion with China.
Beijing initially responded to the Cheonan sinking by calling for restraint
and calm by all parties.^51 It was several weeks before Beijing sent a simple
message of condolence to South Korea expressing sorrow for the loss of South
Korea seamen—a lapse that had a substantial impact on South Korean public
opinion regarding China. Beijing also declined an invitation to send experts
to join the JIG. Once the JIG had finished its work and reached a conclu-
sion, Beijing declined an offer to send a team to Beijing to explain JIG find-
ings. When South Korea offered to send a JIG team to New York to present
its findings to the Security Council, Beijing opposed South Korea’s efforts to
bring the Cheonan incident before the Security Council, preferring to treat