714 { China’s Quest
qian in Chinese), which the Chinese side felt was more suitable for minor,
everyday offenses, such as bumping into a person. Chinese negotiators pre-
ferred that the Japanese word shazai (equivalent to the Chinese word xie
zui) should be used. Each side refused to budge, delaying the issue of the
joint communiqué by five hours.
With Japan’s mea culpa and the joint communiqué out of the way, Jiang
could have put aside the history issue. Again he chose not to. Instead, he
raised the history issue at every turn, including at a formal court banquet
hosted by Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko. Japanese officials feared
that Jiang might embarrass the emperor by raising the history issue during
the banquet, and proposed a deal. If Jiang agreed to stop talking about “his-
tory,” Japan would consider concessions on other matters. The Chinese side
rejected the proposal out of hand, without inquiring what sort of conces-
sions Japan might have in mind. When during the banquet Jiang lectured the
emperor and empress on the sins of Japanese militarism, Japanese officials
visibly paled.^13 The emperor is deeply revered by most Japanese, and Jiang’s
lèse-majesté offended many.
The contrast between Jiang’s emollient behavior during his American visit
in 1997 (discussed in a previous chapter) and his acerbic behavior in Japan
the next year was striking. In the United States, when Jiang was subjected to
repeated, blunt, even harsh and confrontational criticisms of Chinese policy.
He skillfully sidestepped issues or fended them off in a low-key, friendly, and
calm fashion, frequently winning over his audiences with self-deprecating
humor. In Japan, in contrast, Jiang’s approach was heavy-handed, seemingly
designed to browbeat his Japanese audiences into submission. There is no
doubt that Jiang’s cold anger at Japan’s unwillingness to give an uncondi-
tional apology was genuine. But with equal certainty, Jiang’s demeanor in
Japan was also calculated. Before 1993, and again after 2006, Beijing was sat-
isfied with such equivocal apologies as Tokyo could be persuaded to offer.
But not between those dates. Jiang probably calculated that China’s position
was strong and getting steadily stronger relative to Japan, and it was time
for Tokyo to recognize that Japan simply did not have the moral bona fides
to aspire to leadership of East Asia. That status would be held by China, and
Japan should accommodate itself to that emerging reality.
China’s displeasure at Japan’s moral equivocation over the his-
tory issue is understandable. The Japanese self-image of World War II
as a war to liberate the nonwhite races of Asia from domination by the
White Powers was vastly different from the cruel reality of Japan’s rule.^14
Moreover, Germany’s post-1945 reflection on its aggression of the 1930s
and 1940s was unquestionably more profound than Japan’s. Germany’s
more sincere repentance has also been considerably more successful than
Japan’s in reassuring Germany’s neighbors that its power would not again