716 { China’s Quest
use China to offset US pressure. It would be advantageous for China if it could
draw Japan away from the United States. China should therefore be sensi-
tive to the psychology of the Japanese people and adopt a careful, reassur-
ing approach. Finally, China needed Japan’s help for economic development.
Broadly speaking, China’s Japan hands argued that Japan-China ties were
at a turning point. Japan could become China’s partner, or its opponent in
cooperation with the United States. China should attempt to draw Japan into
Asian regional economic integration and greater political independence of
the United States.^16Anti-Japanese Nationalism and the End of Smile DiplomacyBeijing’s smile diplomacy lasted about two years, until a series of Japanese
moves triggered an eruption of nationwide anti-Japan demonstrations. The
downturn in ties started in late 2000 with the approval of new junior high
school history textbooks by Japan’s Ministry of Education, followed by a
flurry of right-wing Japanese nationalist commentary lauding Japan’s noble
mission in the 1930s.^17 Against this background, Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi, who took office in April 2001, visited the Yasukuni Shrine for the
first time as prime minister in August 2001 on the anniversary of Japan’s
World War II surrender. Over the next five years, Koizumi would visit the
shrine annually as he had promised to do during his election campaign, six
times in total, with the last visit coming in August 2006. To top matters off,
several big Japanese companies recalled defective products from the US mar-
ket but not from China’s market, implying that Chinese consumers deserved
lower-quality goods than Americans.
By mid-2001, China was seized by a “Japan-bashing fever,” not yet in the
form of street demonstrations, but taking a myriad other forms. Virulent
anti-Japanese commentary filled blogs. The Chinese media was flooded with
anti-Japanese letters. China’s internet and media were under state control,
and toleration of this anti-Japanese activity reflected a high-level decision to
permit it. Be that as it may, popular passions were real. Chinese workers at
Japanese-run factories went on strike. People condemned as traitors Chinese
movie stars who wore Japanese flag–themed clothing at fashion events in the
United States. A man who rubbed dog excrement on one such hapless film
star was widely lauded as a nationalist hero.^18 This anti-Japanese upsurge was
driven in part by government propaganda, but also reflected rising popular
and autonomous anti-Japanese nationalism. The CCP’s anti-Japanese propa-
ganda, like the sorcerer’s apprentice, had called forth an anti-Japanese storm,
which it would now struggle to control and keep from turning against itself.
Popular and autonomous anti-Japanese rage took the form of street pro-
tests in August 2004 following Japan’s 3–1 victory over China in an Asian