718 { China’s Quest
help the government gain control, but it can also help people who see the gov-
ernment as part of the problem.”^21 China’s government struggled to contain
the protests, shutting down anti-Japanese websites, posting lists of approved
slogans, directing factory managers to ensure that their employees obeyed
regulations, and directing universities to tell students to refrain from protest-
ing or “spreading rumors.”
As anti-Japanese demonstrations mounted, Tokyo asked Beijing to guar-
antee protection of the vast holdings of Japanese firms in China. Tokyo also
asked for an apology from China for failing to prevent damage to Japan’s
commercial and diplomatic interests in China. Beijing flatly rejected these
demands. After three weeks of demonstrations and rising tension in bilateral
relations, Beijing ordered a halt to the protests after Koizumi made a pub-
lic apology for Japan’s aggression in Asia. The protests were getting out of
hand and threatened to injure Japan-China business relations. Hu Jintao and
Koizumi then met for fifty-five minutes on the sidelines of an Asia-Africa
summit in Djakarta in late April. Hu asked Koizumi to “recognize his-
tory correctly,” but did not demand as he had the previous November that
Koizumi stop visiting Yasukuni. Hu also said that the Sino-Japan relation was
“important,” and that the current “difficult situation” was not one that China
wanted to see.^22
As anti-Japanese passions were peaking in 2005, Hu Jintao consolidated his
hold on paramount power by securing Jiang Zemin’s resignation as head of
the state Military Affairs Commission in March. Hu wanted to steer relations
with Japan back onto a less tumultuous path, but needed to protect himself
from criticism for charting such a course. Hu adopted a twofold strategy: on
the Politburo he shared power with rival factions; and he charged a new for-
eign minister, Li Zhaoxing, with continuing strong anti-Japanese rhetoric
while quiet negotiations with Tokyo worked out terms of détente.^23
Several years earlier, Chinese analysts writing in influential journals had
warned that policies based on anti-Japanese passions were injuring China’s
own interests. Acting on irrational impulses such as hatred would prevent
China from being guided by sound strategic calculation and would end up
injuring China, the influential commentator Ma Licheng argued. Rather than
treating Japan in a harsh and ungenerous fashion, as anti-Japanese activists
urged, China should have the generosity of a great, powerful, and victorious
nation. It should not be harsh toward Japan. The emotional hatred of Japan
sweeping across urban China could end up injuring China by isolating it
from the outside world, Ma warned. The xenophobic “Spirit of the Boxers”
which had sought to seal China off from corrupting foreign influences could
be detected in the current “Japan-bashing fever,” Ma argued.
Another analyst, professor Shi Yinhong of People’s University in Beijing,
argued that China’s overriding strategic interest was to draw Japan away
from the United States and balance it against the United States. The scope