Reassuring and Unnerving Japan } 721
tiny islands and their surrounding sea floor. Conflicting territorial claims in
the East China Sea emerged as a serious irritant in Sino-Japan relations in
2004 as both countries moved to develop the natural gas reserves under that
sea’s floor.^27
China claims that the boundary in the East China Sea runs along the out-
ermost edge of the continental shelf, making the largest portion of that sea
and its resources China’s. Japan, on the other hand, insists that the boundary
follows a line equidistant between the coast of mainland China and a western
baseline of the Ryukyu archipelago, dividing the sea equally between China
and Japan. A rich natural gas field, Chunxiao in Chinese, more or less strad-
dles the median line claimed by Japan. The Chunxiao field is estimated to
contain a huge amount of natural gas. Both China and Japan have a great and
growing demand for energy, especially for natural gas, which is environmen-
tally cleaner than either oil or coal. With energy prices rising rapidly in the
2000s, both countries sought to expand supply. Both China and Japan were
also trying to diversify away from the unstable Persian Gulf, which supplied
a large share of both countries’ imported oil. Both countries were also con-
cerned with “energy security” in which they control their own energy supply.
These factors meant that the Chunxiao field was ardently desired by both
Tokyo and Beijing. This situation would have been difficult to handle through
dispassionate diplomatic negotiations in any case. Once nationalist passion
entered the equation, it became far more difficult. Figure 26-4 illustrates these
respective claims in the East China Sea.
In August 2003, China signed contracts with several international oil com-
panies, including British and US firms, to explore resources in Chunxiao.
Although the area designated for development was west of the midline claimed
by Japan as the boundary, it was close enough to that line that since the depos-
its straddle the Japanese claim line, extraction from wells sunk on the Chinese
side held the potential of siphoning gas from the Japanese-claimed area, or at
least so Tokyo believed.^28 Japan responded to China’s moves by commission-
ing a Norwegian ship to undertake seismic surveys of the Chunxiao area.
Chinese coast guard vessels treated the Japan-commissioned Norwegian ship
as a spy, radioed warnings to it, and shadowed it. At one point, a Chinese
coast guard ship nearly collided with the vessel. Meanwhile, China finished
work on a gas production platform just a mile west of Japan’s claim line, with
a pipeline extending westward across 300 miles of sea floor to deliver pumped
gas to Shanghai. Japan’s trade minister inspected the Chinese production
platform from a Japan coast guard airplane, then demanded that China either
cease work on the project or share its seismic and drilling data with Japan.
(Such data would presumably show whether gas in the Japan-claimed area
was being pumped by the Chinese rig.) China rejected these demands and
reiterated earlier calls for a joint venture to develop resources in the area.
Tokyo rejected that proposal and began moving toward a Japanese-only