728 { China’s Quest
CCP decision to allow the demonstrations to continue for a full week was
related in some still not understood way to the transfer of power from Hu
Jintao to Xi Jinping.^47
Large anti-Japanese demonstrations—the largest since 2005—erupted
across China following Tokyo’s September 2012 nationalization of the three
islands. Vicious placards like “Japan must be wiped out” and “Kill Japanese
robbers” were popular with protestors. Police struggled to restrain the angry
mobs. “Wisdom is needed in the expression of patriotism,” Xinhua urged.”^48
When the CCP center decided to bring the demonstrations to a close, it
accompanied directives to that effect with hard-edged diplomacy toward
Japan: more Chinese ships were dispatched to the disputed islands.^49 Roused
nationalist opinion would not countenance weakness. Throughout 2013, the
intensity and forcefulness of Chinese military activity over and around the
Senkaku gradually but steadily increased. PLA reconnaissance aircraft flew
over the disputed islands, causing Japan’s SDF to scramble fighters from
Okinawa. A PLA-N frigate locked its fire control radar onto a JMSDF de-
stroyer. PLA aircraft challenged Japanese warplanes with recklessly close
high-speed passes.^50
Beijing’s strategy toward Japan seems to be to slowly and incrementally use
China’s growing military power to challenge Japan’s claims to the East China
Sea.^51 From 2010 through 2015, Beijing had, in fact, established a nearly con-
stant Chinese presence in these disputed areas, altering the status quo from
a few years ago, when they were under nearly unchallenged Japanese control.
Beijing’s calculus seems to have been that by slowly escalating its military
and paramilitary presence in these contested areas, chances of provoking a
strong Japanese counteraction is reduced. Tension and conflict may gradu-
ally increase but will remain manageable at levels below outright military
conflict. This tough approach to Japan’s transgressions will validate Beijing’s
and Xi Jinping’s nationalist credentials both to potential Politburo rivals and
to China’s public.
Meanwhile, China’s continued enhancement of its overall military power
vis-à-vis the United States and Japan creates increasing doubt in those coun-
tries about whether they could prevail in a military conflict with China over
these islands and waters, and whether or not the United States would deem
them worth a war with a strong China, especially the tiny Senkaku Islands.^52
Crisis over the Senkakus might exacerbate tensions within the US-Japan alli-
ance, with one side or the other eventually deciding to back away from the
alliance for the sake of improved relations with China. Were this to happen,
China’s position would be greatly strengthened, at least according to Beijing’s
calculations. Parallel to increased military pressure, Beijing engages Japan’s
leaders and society, promising far better bilateral relations if Japan accedes to
China’s demands in the East China Sea. Beijing’s objective seems to be to win
control over the East China Sea without fighting.