732 { China’s Quest
reorienting its national security strategy. In December 2010, Japan adopted
new Defense Guidelines to replace ones dating to 2004. While the new guide-
lines had been developed over many months, the flaring confrontation over
the Senkakus, plus China’s growing maritime activism, made clear their rel-
evance to China. The new guidelines shifted the focus of Japan’s defense effort
from Hokkaido in the north to the islands and waters lying between Kyushu
and the Senkakus. Ground forces designed to cope with a Russian invasion
from the north were cut, while maritime and air surveillance capabilities in
the Ryukyus were strengthened. Under the new guidelines, the JSDF was to
build permanent stations, including missile defense bases, on several of the
Ryukyu Islands beyond the main island of Okinawa, which already had a
strong US defense presence. Vietnam War–era F-4 fighters in the Ryukyus
were to be replaced with newer F-15s. Six new Aegis-equipped ballistic missile
defense destroyers were to be added to the JMSDF. The JMSDF was to develop
a specialized amphibious assault force comparable to the US marines, includ-
ing small, highly flexible forces that could be quickly deployed by aircraft
or by amphibious landing to contested islands. Japan’s submarine fleet was
to grow from sixteen to twenty-two, and additional small helicopter carri-
ers dedicated to antisubmarine operations were to be added. Integration of
US and Japanese forces was to be boosted by sharing command centers and
intelligence. Japan’s MSDF would assume increased responsibility for anti-
submarine operations, freeing the US navy for other operations. The guide-
lines also called for “deepening and developing” Japan’s military alliance
with the United States and enhancing security cooperation with South Korea,
Australia, ASEAN countries, and India. From the perspective of Japan’s secu-
rity, priority was to be placed on “improving capabilities to respond to attacks
on offshore islands.” By early 2011, JMSDF aircraft were conducting regular
air patrols of the Chunxiao field and the Senkakus.^58 Japan was preparing for
possible military conflict with China in the East China Sea.
This shift in Japanese policy was not due entirely to China’s policies.
Political forces within Japan that favored a more nationalist course and
a stronger military seized on China’s words and actions to move Japan in
the direction they desired. But mainstream Japanese also shifted to become,
step by step, more apprehensive of how China would use its steadily grow-
ing strength. These apprehensions were reflected in the evolution of Japanese
defense and security policy. In sum, Beijing’s combination of friendship
diplomacy and pressure did not succeed in reassuring Japan, in making it
feel comfortable with and not threatened by China’s growing power. In fact,
Beijing’s words and actions pushed Japan in the opposite direction, toward
greater military preparedness plus alignment with other countries similarly
apprehensive about China’s future course.
China’s media did not recognize that Japan’s reorientation of military
strategy was a response to China’s actions. Instead, it blamed the shift on evil