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editors learned to navigate between “the party line” and “the bottom line,”
selling papers by peddling fire-breathing nationalist resentment against for-
eign transgressors. The commercial press was considerably more nationalist
than the party press, which is less dependent on market appeal. The CCP
state used this popular nationalist activism to legitimize its authority and
to gain leverage in negotiating with foreign governments. But CCP leaders
clearly understood that the costs of belligerent and confrontational policies
might be heavy, and calmly and reasonably settled disputes with foreign
states—although they sometimes insisted on doing this behind closed doors
and while concealing from China’s popular nationalists their reasonable,
nonconfrontational approach.
The PRC state attempted to bring nationalist cyber discussion under its
control in a number of ways. One was insulation of China’s Internet from the
World Wide Web. Chinese web users were routed through Chinese servers,
where access to politically objectionable content on the World Wide Web was
blocked. Sophisticated Chinese web users, armed with special software, could
circumvent these obstacles, but for the great majority of Chinese web users
this “great firewall of China” was effective in blocking access to material that
might challenge the orthodox narrative. The Ministry of State Security also
employed a large number of people (reportedly over one million) to censor
online commentary—probably routing it for further analysis and investiga-
tion. The MFA also set up a website of its own to host a discussion of China’s
foreign affairs. Critical questions and comments were invited and responded
to by MFA specialists. Finally, special reports on the substance of online criti-
cism of China’s foreign policies were routinely prepared by the MSS for pe-
rusal by the Politburo.
Beijing’s handling of conflict with other states sometimes touched on the
political survival of the incumbent paramount leader. Susan Shirk outlined
several ways in which perceived weakness in dealing with foreign “humilia-
tion” might lead to leadership change. Rivals within the Politburo might use
the opportunity to oust the incumbent paramount leader. The PLA might
withdraw its support for the incumbent paramount leader—a development
which would almost certainly lead to the removal of that leader—or hesitate
to carry out an order by the paramount leader to use violent force to suppress
nationalist demonstrations and movements. Developments along these lines
could compel the CCP to enter a path of dialogue with the opposition, a path
that would probably lead to a power-sharing arrangement, effectively ending
the CCP’s monopoly control over state power.
The likely trigger of any of these forms of regime change would be nation-
alist street demonstrations followed by quick emergence of nationalist move-
ments. Nationalist street demonstrations are potentially very dangerous to
the party. The center’s handling of the Belgrade embassy bombing, the Falun
Gong convergence, the EP-3 episode, and the fishing-boat captain incident all