Notes to pages 279–286 } 813
730–9. Thomas W. Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development
and the March 1969 Clashes,” American Political Science Review, vol. 66, no. 4 (December
1972), pp. 1175–202. Harold Hinton, Bear at the Gate: Chinese Policymaking under Soviet
Pressure, Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1971, and “Conflict on the Ussuri: A Clash
of Nationalisms,” Problems of Communism, vol. 20, nos. 1 and 2 (January –April 1971),
pp. 48–59.
- Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, p. 232. Whiting’s study deals primarily with India in 1962 and Indochina
in 1965, but he suggests that the same logic applied to the Soviet border in 1969. - Pantsov and Levine, Mao, p. 538.
- John Garver, China’s Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, Boulder,
CO: Westview, 1982, pp. 65–7. - “CCP Central Committed Order for General Mobilization in Border Provinces and
Reg ions,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 11 (Winter 1998), pp. 168–9. - Arkady Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, New York: Ballantine, 1985, pp. 165–8.
Pantsov and Levine, Mao, p. 538. - Garver, China’s Decision, pp. 68–9.
- Interview with Allen S. Whiting, December 16, 1978. Whiting was a fellow at the
Rand Corporation and an advisor to Henry Kissinger during the 1969 crisis. See Garver,
China’s Decision for Rapprochement, p. 82, note 55. - Golam W. Choudhury, Brezhnev’s Collective Security Plan for Asia, Washington,
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1976, p. 12. Choudhury was an advisor
to the Pakistani government at that time. - Quoted in Garver, Rapprochement, p. 75.
- John Wong, “Chinese Demand for Southeast Asian Rubber, 1949–1972”, China
Quarterly, no. 63 (September 1975), pp. 490–514. - Letter, Zhou Enlai to Alexei Kosygin, September 18, 1969, IHCWP Bulletin, no. 11
(Winter 1998) , pp. 171–2. - “Zhou Enlai’s Talk at a Meeting of the Chinese Delegation Attending the
Sino-Soviet Border Negotiations,” October 7, 1969, ibid., pp. 172–3. - This section follows Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last
Revolution, Cambridge: Belknap, 2006, pp. 316–20.
Chapter 11. Rapprochement with the United States
- George Lefebvre, The Thermidorians, New York: Vintage, 1964. R. R. Palmer, Tw e l v e
Who Ruled: The Year of the Terror in the French Revolution, New York: Atheneum, 1965. - It was formerly widely believed by Sinologists that Lin Biao was opposed to Mao’s
decision to improve relations with the United States. Mao and Zhou later told foreign
leaders (Nixon, Albania’s Hoxha, etc.) that Lin had opposed the opening to the United
States. Recent scholarship based on fuller investigation of Chinese materials indicates
that this long-held view must be discarded. There is no evidence that Lin was involved
in or expressed any opposition to Mao’s clear guidance of Chinese foreign policy at this
juncture or any other time. Apparently Mao and Zhou found it expedient to mislead
foreigners about what Lin’s rebellion entailed. See Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven
I. Levine, Mao: The Real Story, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012, pp. 540–54. Yafeng