China\'s Quest. The History of the Foreign Relations of the People\'s Republic of China - John Garver

816 { Notes to pages 313–321

a source of great criticism of Nixon’s management of foreign affairs. The US naval dem-

onstration against India at this juncture was also one of several instances in which the

United States aligned with China against India—episodes that remain deep in the Indian

political consciousness.

54. “Top Secret Memorandum of Conversation,” in William Burr, The Kissinger
    Transcripts:  The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow, New  York:  New Press, 1998,
    pp. 48–57.


55. Unfortunately, Huang Hua in his memoir says nothing about his talks with
    Kissinger. Huang Hua, Memoirs, pp. 262–4.


56. The Chinese protest is in Survey of China Mainland Press, no. 5041–5044, December
    29–30, 1971, pp. 79–80.


57. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 912.


58. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 906.


59. Regarding this special Tibetan force, see Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison,
    The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002, pp. 219, 225.

Chapter 12. Countering Soviet Encirclement and Trying to Preserve Mao’s Legacy

1. This section follows Gao Wenqian, Zhou Enlai:  The Last Perfect Revolutionary,
   New  York:  Public Affairs, 2007, p.  17. Gao was the official biographer of Zhou Enlai at
   the Research Office of the CCP Central Documentation for over a decade. His account is
   based on extensive and largely previously unavailable documents from that office which
   he smuggled out of China.


2. Gao Wenqian, Zhou Enlai, p. 238.


3. Gao Wenqian, Zhou Enlai, pp. 238–9.


4. Gao Wenqian, Zhou Enlai, p. 242.


5. Andrew Mertha, Brothers in Arms:  Chinese Aid to the Khmer Rouge, 1975–1979,
   Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014, p. 2.


6. Mertha, Brothers in Arms, p. 5.


7. This section follows Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, Boston:  Little Brown,
   1982, pp. 340–67.


8. Zhou’s prognosis regarding Khmer Rouge rule in Cambodia was similar to his
   estimate of the eventual outcome of Pakistani’s brutal repression in Eastern Pakistan in
   1971—Indian intervention and Bangladeshi independence.


9. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 367.


10. Mertha, Brothers in Arms, pp. 5–6.


11. Gao Wenqian, Zhou Enlai, p. 243.


12. Gao Wenqian, Zhou Enlai, p. 258.


13. Gao Wenqian stresses the point that Deng was Mao’s man, not Zhou’s as is often
    commonly assumed. Mao feared Zhou would undo Cultural Revolution policies if he out-
    lived him. Deng was one person Mao thought could run China’s economy, and intended
    to replace Zhou with Deng—if Deng could convince him of his loyalty to the Cultural
    Revolution “achievements.” Mao, according to Gao, envisioned a duumvirate succession
    arrangement:  Zhang Chunqiao would run propaganda, culture, and continue political
    struggle, while Deng would replace Zhou in running the economy and state administration.


14. Henry Kissinger, On China, New York: Penguin Press, 2011, pp. 314–20.