War in Korea and Indochina } 63
was fanned by communist agitators. South Korea’s young democracy was
weak and chaotic, with many parties and individuals vying for power. Unlike
in Japan, where US policy planners had given considerable wartime atten-
tion to postwar rule, in South Korea US support for the emergence of a stable
democratic polity was not well thought through or particularly effective. Kim
Il Sung and the KWP hoped to use this disorder in the South and seize the
opportunity to “liberate” the South and unify the entire Korean nation and
peninsula under communist rule. According to a top secret 1966 study by
the Soviet foreign ministry intended to serve as background for Soviet nego-
tiators, in 1948, after separate governments were formed in North and South
Korea and after first Soviet and then American forces were withdrawn from
their respective occupation zones, “Kim Il Sung and other Korean leaders
were firmly determined to unify the country by military means.” The Soviet
backgrounder continues:
Calculating that the USA would not enter a war over South Korea, Kim
Il Sung persistently pressed for agreement from Stalin and Mao Zedong
to reunify the country by military means. Stalin at first treated the per-
sistent appeals of Kim Il Sung with reserve, noting that “such a large
affair ... needs much preparation,” but he did not object in principle.
The final agreement to support the plans of the Koreans was given by
Stalin at the time of Kim Il Sung’s visit to Moscow in March–April 1950.
Following this, in May, Kim Il Sung visited Beijing and secured the sup-
port of Mao.^12
Kim was confident that North Korean forces, assisted by uprisings in the
South, could “liberate” the South in a week or so. The plan that Kim finally
sold Stalin on in May 1950 envisioned the conquest of the South in six days.
Stalin rejected Kim’s proposals until early 1950. Stalin feared that an all-out at-
tack by North Korean might trigger a war with the United States.^13 Until April
1950, Stalin vetoed Kim’s plan for war. Several factors contributed to Stalin’s
shift and acceptance of Kim’s war plan. Probably the most important were
authoritative statements by top US leaders indicating that the United States
would not intervene in Korea. On January 5, President Harry Truman told
a press conference that the United States would not intervene in the Taiwan
Straits (where the PLA was mobilizing) even if there were an attack. A more
detailed exposition of US policy came onJanuary 12, 1950, when Secretary of
State Dean Acheson addressed the National Press Club about the new US
security strategy in the Far East following the communist victory in China.
The United States had drawn a new defense perimeter in the Far East, Acheson
said, running from the Aleutians to Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines.
Taiwan and South Korea were pointedly outside that perimeter. Regarding
areas beyond the perimeter, Acheson said, “no person can guarantee these
areas against military attack,” and to attempt to do so was neither sensible,