War in Korea and Indochina } 69
foreign intervention— of Stalin, not Mao—until September 29, the day before
the first South Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel. At that point, Kim
cabled Stalin asking for “direct military aid” from the Soviet Union or, if
that was not possible, “assistance in the creation of international volunteers
in China.” Stalin replied by telling Kim to address his query to Mao.^24 Kim
complied.
The CCP Politburo met the next day, October 2, to consider Kim’s request.
Mao opened the session by saying that the question was not whether but
how fast to intervene. After the session, Mao cabled Stalin that China would
send forces to Korea. Mao explained why: “If Korea were completely occu-
pied by the Americans and Korean revolutionary forces were fundamentally
destroyed, the American invaders would be more rampant, and such a situ-
ation would be unfavorable to the whole East.”^25 In other words, the balance
between revolution and reaction across Asia would be adversely affected. At
the end of another Politburo session on October 4, convened to review dif-
ficulties likely to be encountered during the upcoming Korean intervention,
Mao, after listening to a long list of concerns, concluded: “All you have said
is not without ground. [But] When other people are in a crisis, how can we
stand aside with our arms folded?”^26 Peng Dehuai, selected by Mao to com-
mand China’s forces in Korea, addressed one of the concerns raised during
the Politburo session. Some comrades had expressed apprehension that war
with the United States would make achievement of domestic unity difficult.
In fact, Peng asserted, war would provide an opportunity to deflate the bluster
of domestic reactionary forces.
On October 7, a US division crossed the 38th parallel. The next day Mao
ordered 200,000 of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV), as the NEBDA
had been renamed, to enter North Korea to assist the Korean revolutionary
forces and confront the American invaders. The appellation Chinese People’s
Volunteers was a ploy designed to make China’s entry look unofficial, making
a formal state of war, and thus activation of the February 1950 treaty, some-
what less likely. The operational objective of Chinese forces when they entered
Korea in October 1950 was nothing less than expulsion of US forces from the
Korean peninsula. Following a decisive Politburo meeting on October 2, Mao
informed Stalin of China’s decision to intervene, explaining:
[W] e shall aim at resolving the conflict, that is, to eliminate the US
troops within Korea or to drive them and other countries’ aggressive
forces out [of Korea]. ... we must prepare for the possibility that the
US would declare a general war on China or it would at least bomb
China’s major cities and industrial base ...[But we are] more concerned
about whether Chinese troops could wipe out the American forces within
Korea’s boundary ... As long as our troops are able to eliminate the
Eighth Army [one of America’s old armies, with considerable combat