THE FRENCH INVASION OF ITALY, 1494-95the kingdom in 1510, though a final expulsion did not occur
for another thirty years; the protective cover offered by the
old Aragonese dynasty of Naples was thus blown away. 1503
marked not a restoration of the native dynasty but its replace-
ment by Spanish cousins who were still unsure what priority
needed to be placed on Italian affairs. Would the French
return? Would the Turks return? Would the south Italian
barons enjoy the absence of their monarch, and build ever
more powerful statelets? Would Ferdinand of Aragon become
so marginalised in Castile that he would decide to follow in
his uncle Alfonso's footsteps, abandoning his Spanish lands
and concerns for Italy? These were all possibilities. The Italian
wars tended in future to be fought further north, with Milan
as a major focus; the Turks never quite managed their return,
and Ferdinand was not in the end excluded from Spanish
affairs. The two kingdoms of Sicily thus remained provinces
of a larger Spanish empire.
CONCLUSION
The French invasion of Italy represented a reversion, after
the pragmatic policies of Louis XI, to the Angevin dream of
acquiring control not merely of southern Italy but of the
title to Jerusalem as well; quite apart from its romantic con-
notations, recalling both the legends of Charlemagne and
the career of Charles of Anjou, the crusade was seen, not
without some justice, as a matter of urgency; and southern
Italy, in the best Angevin tradition, was regarded as an ideal
launching pad for a war in the East by the third Charles,
Charles VIII of Valois. Charles's expedition was, however,
substantially facilitated by the appeal of Ludovico il Moro
for the French to intervene, an appeal which the Milanese
ruler soon regretted, and which was largely intended to help
Ludovico consolidate his own position in Milan. As it was,
the French invasion coincided with a period of weakness in
Italy, following the death of both Lorenzo de'Medici and
Ferrante d'Aragona; old alliances had fallen to pieces, and
the champions of the peace of Italy had been replaced by
heirs who seemed less certain of their ability to retain power
by the combination of charm and ruthlessness their prede-
cessors had managed so well. Neither Alfonso II of Naples